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THE PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
CHUCK HENSON*
It is one of the Negro's great contributions to American society that his drive for equal
opportunity is giving impetus to a social revolution that, measured by the number of
people helped, will be far more beneficial to whites than to Negroes.'
INTRODUCTION
Some things have an obvious and enduring purpose. The purpose of a
hammer is to drive nails. The purpose of a saw is to cut wood. The purpose of
nails is to fasten, for example, the freshly cut wood by being driven by a ham-
mer. For other things, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Act" or
"1964 Act"), purpose seems mutable or hidden. For example, finishing the sen-
tence today: "The purpose of Title VII is . . ." presents a problem. It has
presented the same problem since 1964. What Title VII does is not obvious
gauged against the widely announced problem it was meant to solve: Black
unemployment and underemployment. The obscurity of its purpose is troub-
ling particularly if you are Black because Title VII has had no apparent effect
on Black joblessness.' Whether Blacks are equal citizens otherwise is widely
questioned.' What was Title VII meant to achieve for Black Americans?
Beyond the symbolic act of stating the equality principle as the core of federal
* Trial Practice Professor of Law, Senior Fellow Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution,
University of Missouri School of Law; Juris Doctor, Georgetown University Law Center, 1990; Bachelor
of Arts, Yale University, 1987. Special thanks to my friend Mr. Percy Green for inviting me to continue
to explore his story. And, as always to Renee E. Henson, Esq. without whom nothing would be
possible.
1. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 212-13(1966).
2. Referring to the proposed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, key legislators recognized that
voting rights, school desegregation, and the desegregation of public accommodations had little mean-
ing in the absence of jobs:
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach. The
impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the
graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a shallow victory where one's
pockets are empty. The principle of equal treatment under law can have little meaning if in
practice its benefits are denied the citizen.
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 2513 (1963). Unemployment, employment by occupation, and wage
statistics showed nonwhite unemployment at more than twice the rate of white unemployment. See id.
In 1979, the continuing employment disparity led the Supreme Court to describe the purpose of
Title VII as opening to blacks previously foreclosed employment opportunities as a foundation to the
Court's decision to permit short term private affirmative action in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). The Weber Court specifically noted that the unemployment rates had not
changed since Title VII became law in 1964: "The problem that Congress addressed in 1964 remains
with us. In 1962, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white rate." Id. at 204
n.4. "In 1978, the black unemployment rate was 129% higher." Id. Historically, black unemployment
rates have continued to be twice as high as white unemployment rates. See Data Retrieval- Labor Force
Statistics (CPS), BuREAu OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bis.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2019) (check box for "unemployment rate" under "not seasonally adjusted" column for
"White" and "Black of African American" subcategories; then select "Retrieve data").
3. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEWJIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN TIE AGE OF
COLORBUINDNESS (2010); CAROL ANDERSON, WirrE RAGE: THlE UNSPOKEN TRtli OF OUR RACIAL
DIVIDE (2016); ERIc FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998); ARLIE RuSSEL HocuscitILo,
STRANGERS IN THEIR OwN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RiGirr (2016); IBRAM X.
KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RAcisr IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016).
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employment discrimination law, a reasonable answer to the question seems to
be: Nothing. Nothing was done to cure the impact of race-based exclusion
from educational and job opportunity because that cure required discrimina-
tion in favor of Blacks. The equality principle cannot both prohibit discrimina-
tion against Blacks and allow discrimination in favor of Blacks.
Early reflections on Title VII's purposes suggest that some expected it to
achieve change on a scale commensurate with their beliefs about the signifi-
cance of the Civil Rights Era and its centerpiece, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Immediately after the Act's passage, it became clear that Title VII could not
sustain the weight of expectations that the Civil Rights Era encouraged.
Defeated expectations led to scholarly expressions of outrage and disappoint-
ment at Title VII's limitations. These expectations beg the question: What was
the purpose of the 1964 Act? Exploring the reasons for the Act informs answers
about what its seventh title was meant to achieve at the time. A primary cause of
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the negative influence of the "Negro problem"
on America's foreign policy goals.' Although discrimination touched every part
of life in every part of this country, it was only visible to domestic and interna-
tional audiences because of how southern White people practiced discrimina-
tion. America could not, without great irony, sell itself in the early 1960s as the
ideal of a free and democratic society while it tolerated, because of federalism,
5
open apartheid south of the Mason-Dixon line. For largely foreign policy rea-
sons, in 1963 it became urgent to create a symbol to show the world that the
United States would live the creed it espoused: "[M]en are created equal"
including Black Americans.
As a symbol, the 1964 Act served its foreign policy purpose. It is much
easier to state (and there is strong support in the historical record) that a pur-
pose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to be an icon of American beliefs in the
ideological combat for the hearts and minds of the non-European, newly
emerging, non-white world that, at the time, occupied much of the attention of
the cold warriors. The purpose of Title VII was the same as the 1964 Act, a tool
in achieving America's foreign policy objectives. Historians write that the Act
successfully served its purpose.' It created an international belief that America
was committed to the equality of all people, including its Black citizens.
7 Hav-
ing the Act was the success.'
The Act, however, was also an expression of domestic policy. Like ham-
mers, most of which are also designed to remove nails, the Act was also
designed as a symbol to American citizens. The symbolism derives in part from
finally achieving a federal law that breached that part of federalism that accom-
modated legalized inequality. Accomplishing the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was a big deal. The public policy of equality reached access to educa-
tion, public accommodations, voting, and employment. According to the politi-
cians the title related to employment-Title VII-was the most important part
of the 1964 Act because none of the other rights it contained meant much
4. I do not assert that American foreign policy goals were the sole cause of the 1964 Act There
was an exponential escalation in pressure for civil rights accompanied by an escalation in violence in
the south and northern cities. See NICK BRYANT, THE BYSTANDER: JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR B[ACK EQUALty 1-3 (2006). Blacks were not only subject to violence at the hands of whites, but
the early 60s saw for the first time Blacks beginning to respond to violence with violence. See id. I only
assert that foreign policy was an essential cause of the 1964 Act.
5. Federalism was the excuse politicians gave to emerging African nations for why America had
to tolerate a dejure racially segregated system in the south. See MARY L. DJDZIAK, COLD. WAR CiVIL
Rjcs frs: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMotCRA(vt 215 (2000).
6. See id. at 235.
7. Id. at 210-11, 240.
8. Id. at 212-14.
THE PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
without an income to give Blacks an opportunity to enjoy them.' First class
economic citizenship was the path that led to first class citizenship for Blacks.
The 1964 Act and Title VII, however, have always been contested symbols
in this country. For some, passage of the law signified the achievement of
equality. In the South most obviously, others saw the Act wrongfully taking
away their rights to achieve an unwanted equality for someone else. Ironically,
equality seemed to be a zero-sum concept. Some Americans believed that
granting Blacks equality meant that Whites lost equality. In some measure,
belief in the positive or negative powers of equality also indicates expectations
about a level of social transformation. The Act and Title VII deal with equality
on this level by primarily addressing conduct and prohibiting illegal conduct
defined as "discrimination." Equality was also a trap. It required everyone to be
treated the same way. There could be no valid discrimination in favor of Blacks
to overcome a history of separateness-an inequality in every sphere of Ameri-
can life that prepared people for successfully competing in the labor market.
Title VII, for instance, was meant to provide equality through equal access to
employment by commanding gatekeepers to ignore race as a job qualification.
Equality required that outcome and nothing more.
Friends and foes of civil rights vetted the equal treatment aspect of equality
openly. The discussion surrounded mainly what equality would mean for inno-
cent White people. Would Blacks receive jobs because of their Blackness and
Whites lose their jobs regardless of their longevity or skills? Equality of treat-
ment of White workers and businesses so dominated the discussion that there
was no open conversation about the responsibility of White people generally or
the accountability of the nation for slavery and its aftermath, Jim Crow. Moreo-
ver, Black civil rights leadership purposefully did not demand a law that might,
as a domestic Marshall Plan specifically for Blacks, suit a purpose consistent
with solving the immediate problems."0
Domestically, because of equality's limitations, some "militant" Blacks and
"liberal" scholars and jurists found the equality that Title VII embodied want-
ing. As Professor Derrick Bell would write in 1977, "if the country was really
committed to eradicating the social and economic burdens borne by the victims
of employment discrimination, it would have fashioned a far more efficacious
means of accomplishing this result."" By limiting its work to equal access, Title
VII did not solve the immediate problem of giving Blacks jobs to fix the crisis of
Black underemployment and unemployment. For these thinkers, discrimina-
tion under the Act needed to be different in scope than the simplistic idea that
discrimination in job access and job success would come to a screeching halt on
Title VII's effective date: July 2, 1965. The equality principle, which defined
discrimination under the Act, did nothing to account for the historical effects
of discrimination: the tragic under-preparedness of Blacks to compete for jobs
in the modern employment marketplace. It also ignored the present impact of
this basic problem on Blacks with jobs, but without training or access to training
based on a history of segregation. In the first case, equal opportunity to com-
pete helped no Blacks. In the second, Blacks were doomed to remain segre-
gated and underemployed; a sacrifice on the altar of the equality principle for
the handful of Blacks with the requisite job preparedness to compete on an
equal footing with Whites after July 2, 1965.
9. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 2513 (1963).
10. HuGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIViL RicHTs ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL Pot-
icy 1960-1972 (1990).
11. Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Foreword: Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 681, 681 (1977).
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The scholars, commentators, and jurists who were unsatisfied with this ver-
sion of equality contested the equality purpose of Title VII. For this group Title
VII did not live up to expectations because it did not solve the immediate prob-
lem or provide a solution that would have an effect in the immediate genera-
tion. Equality of access inadequately expressed the antidote to the reality of
discrimination. The "Negro problem" needed a resolution based in equitable
outcomes regardless of Title VII's legislative history or the political com-
promises contained in its words. Title VII should do more. In determining
what that "more" was, scholars created a new concept of discrimination which
some district court judges and some circuit courts adopted with gusto in the
run-up to Griggs v. Duke Power Co."
2 This group created the original "basic
assumption" to make Title VII a vehicle for a form of equality that acknowl-
edged how race discrimination worked. It assumed a base level of discrimina-
tion continued to exist regardless of present intent. It also assumed that if the
zero-sum game of equality had a cost, the most innocent, the Black Americans,
would not pay that cost. There was little fear of cost because these thinkers
believed that their conceptualization of discrimination avoided any conflict
with the equality principle. According to the original "basic assumption," the
history of racial discrimination was so pervasive that all White employers and
unions were guilty of racism. All Black employees or applicants were innocent
victims. Every adverse employment decision required, therefore, that the
employer or union demonstrate through objective facts the absence of any taint
of historical racism in a present adverse employment decision. This is the con-
ceptualization of discrimination that the Court appeared to ratify in Griggs. For
that reason, one early Title VII scholar claimed that no Title VII Supreme Court
decision "before or since" Griggs has had its "explosive potential" on the level of
Brown v. Board of Education." Griggs was the heart of Title VII," and its "eluci-
dation" might "[occupy] us for the next four decades."" Something beyond
merely merit-based equality became Title VII's purpose.
Through Griggs the Court gave the impression of planting a purpose in
Title VII: "[T]o achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barn-
ers which have operated in the past in favor of an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees." 6 To fulfill that outcome based purpose, no employment
policies or tests, regardless of neutrality or intent, could withstand Title VII "if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices."' 7 There was at the time no designation of this new conceptualization of
discrimination as "disparate impact" and no contrast drawn between disparate
impact and disparate treatment. Accordingly, after Griggs, one of the primary
shapers of the new conceptualization of discrimination, the Court of Appeals
for Eighth Circuit, used its understanding of Griggs in rooting out discrimina-
tion in the yet undefined disparate treatment space. The Eighth Circuit
applied the original basic assumption to the case of Percy Green against the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. James E. Jones, Jr., The Development of the Law Under Title VI Since 1965: Implications of the New
Law, 30 RLtrGERs U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976).
14. See id. at 1-2 ("The Supreme Court [in Griggs] enunciated several broad principles which are
fundamental to the evolution of Title VII law, the most significant being a new concept of discrimina-
tion: . . . 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.' (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis
added)).
15. See id. at 6.
16. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
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In 1973, for the first time, the Supreme Court segregated what we now call
disparate impact from disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.1"
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's use of the new conceptualization of
discrimination in disparate treatment cases. In doing so, the Court responded
to a threat against the equality principle which, arguably, Griggs avoided, by
reasserting the equality principle as the limit of discrimination in all other
cases. The Court revised the Eighth Circuit's formulation of the "basic assump-
tion" with a new version that eliminated the requirement that employers dis-
prove their racism. The "basic assumption" 2.0 is the notorious McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis. Scholars today recognize that McDonnell Doug-
las was not the mere cautionary tale it appeared to be in the mid-1970s."'
Rather, modern scholars contest McDonnell Douglas as representing a deviation
from and denial of Title VII's purpose.
This Article explores Title VII's contested purposes. Revealing Title VII's
purposes requires connecting Griggs to McDonnellDouglas as a complete chroni-
cle of the conflict between the equality principle and Black unemployment and
under employment. I believe that the lingering and potent belief in Title VII
stems from the success of Griggs in temporarily endowing Title VII with powers
beyond the equality principle. This idealized version of Title VII remains to this
day as a statement of what Title VII was meant to achieve despite what the Court
did via McDonnell Douglas to set parameters around Griggs consistent with the
equality principle and to formally restate the equality principle as Title VII's
only purpose.
Starting with issue of purposes, the first two sections of this Article explore
the limits of Title VII's purposes by contrasting the problem of Black unemploy-
ment with the choice the 88th Congress made to pursue inequality of opportu-
nity rather than jobs for Black people. I argue that Title VII's purpose was
forged from values of policy makers that were not focused exclusively or even
primarily on solving the problem of Black unemployment. These policy makers
were driven by American foreign policy goals, the urgency of doing something,
and domestic political concerns. The equality principle, with its limits on com-
pletely equal treatment, allowed policy makers to fulfill their goals. In crafting
the Act and Title VII, they conceptualized a simplistic form of discrimination
and protected their constituents from Title VII's impact. The resulting law
could do nothing about immediately employing large groups of Black Ameri-
cans because it outlawed the compensatory elements needed to accomplish that
goal.
The third section of this Article turns to why and how scholars and judges
reconceptualized discrimination. Here, I argue that Title VII's obvious weak-
nesses created disappointment and disbelief. I will focus on certain primary
weaknesses: Title VII's focus on only the "worst" forms of discrimination; Title
VII's safe harbor for existing management and union prerogatives; and the fact
that Title VII only applied to future discrimination.20 These primary weak-
nesses created a vacuum of unfulfilled expectations that Title VII would deal
with the current problems of Black unemployment and underemployment and
fix the problem of discriminatory hiring in present and the future. To fill this
vacuum, scholars and judges reviewed Title VII and concluded that the 88th
Congress must not have intended to do so little. These same scholars and
18. See 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19. But seeJones, supra note 13, at 9 (McDonnell Douglas was merely a cautionary tale that "the
normal sanctions associated with serious employee misconduct will not be subject to the strict job
relatedness rule of [Gigs.]").
20. Other weaknesses include the weakness of the EEOC and burdening the complaining party
with the expense of litigating discrimination.
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judges determined, therefore, to give Title VII the purpose of eliminating more
than the "worst" forms of discrimination by dealing with the reality of racism in
the United States. They reconceptualized discrimination to capture discrimina-
tion in a space the equality principle did not cover. They theorized an absence
of conflict between the equality principle and remedying the present impacts of
historical discrimination at the junction of segregated unions and segregated
employment. In the process they eliminated the safe harbors and time con-
straints Title VII contained and created the original "basic assumption" to
empower Title VII: the explanation for any adverse employment action is race
discrimination unless the employer proves otherwise with substantial objective
evidence of job-relatedness.
In the fourth section of this Article I argue that the Eighth Circuit, as one
of the key proponents and developers of the expanded definition of discrimina-
tion that led to Griggs, took Griggs as a direction to apply the original basic
assumption to all employment discrimination cases. When the Eighth Circuit
decided McDonnell Douglas, it did just that. The Court then took the opportu-
nity with McDonnell Douglas to contest the purpose of Title VII given to it by the
Eighth Circuit. Griggs was not a global repurposing of Title VII. By the mid-
1970s the judiciary busily shrank Griggs to only certain types of jobs and certain
types of tests. Meanwhile, as a reassertion and confirmation of the equality
principle, McDonnell Douglas grew in prominence and set basic assumption 2.0
as the limit of the kind of discrimination Title VII prohibits: equality of access.
In the fifth and final section of this Article I consider the possibility of a
further reconceptualization of discrimination. I urge the abandonment of
McDonnell Douglas. It inappropriately displaces juries from deciding whether
Black Americans are suffering from employment discrimination and relies on a
fiction about how people make decisions about the qualities of other people
out of date with modern science on how unconscious bias drives decision-
making.
I. THE FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSE OF TIT VII
"Purpose" means "something set up as an object or end to be attained."2 '
Purpose must also suppose the identification of the end or ends to be attained
in order to make sense of purpose as a mechanism to reach a goal or goals. To
understand the purpose or purposes of Title VII we must explore the issues
politicians and legislators had in mind in the 1960s and the means by which
politicians and legislators dealt with those issues. Two issues immediately
spring to mind: winning the "Cold War" and the "Negro problem," also known
as the struggle for equality for Black Americans. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
arrived at the intersection of these issues. The purpose of the 1964 Act was the
result of how policy makers prioritized and balanced the relationship between
defining the United States as the epitome of a free society in its competition
against the Soviet and Chinese communists and how a colorblind America
could manifest without a remedy for the present effects of historical discrimina-
tion against Blacks.
In the early 1960s, the "Negro problem"
2 2 for Black Americans was the de
jure (in the South) and defacto (everywhere else) exclusion from political and
21. Purpose, MERRAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merciam-webster.com/diction-
ary/purpose (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
22. The "Negro problem" was shorthand for the problem of race discrimination and the depri-
vation of economic, civil, and political rights for Black Americans.
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economic opportunity.23 For White politicians, the "Negro problem" was one
of public relations. People in the United States and around the world could
turn on a television and watch Whites burning, bombing, and beating Black
Americans because they insisted on the end of legal segregation in this coun-
try.24 The "Negro problem" was bad for the United States' international inter-
ests at a time when those interests focused on selling American Freedom to
Africa, Asia, and South America.25 The "Negro problem" gave America's Cold
War enemies the perfect weapon to undermine American foreign policy: live
action video of the "freedom" of Black Americans.
Ironically, President Kennedy's heavy interest in foreign policy is exactly
what made him focus, in the end, on civil rights for Black Americans. 26
Although Blacks had been seeking full citizenship in this country before and
since its founding, Kennedy became sufficiently interested in civil rights when
images of Blacks protesting for their rights and being attacked by White law
enforcement in Birmingham, Alabama were televised around the world. It took
Eugene "Bull" Connor fulfilling his promise to "keep the niggers in their place"
with police dogs, fire hoses and cattle prods in April 1963 to get civil rights for
Black Americans firmly on Kennedy's radar." And that happened because
African nations that Kennedy was trying to keep from communism saw the
broadcasts and warned Kennedy that "the ears and eyes of the world are con-
centrated on events in Alabama."28 From one perspective, the problem to be
solved was the source of the bad press: Blacks demonstrating for civil rights."
President Kennedy's June 11, 1963 proposal for sweeping civil rights legis-
lation was set up largely to solve the problem of Black protest and its impact on
American foreign policy."o When Kennedy finally took the moral high ground
on June 11, he challenged the nation to deal with what the media portrayed as
a purely sectional issue knowing that only a bipartisan coalition could pass any
proposed civil rights legislation over the anticipated filibuster of Southern Dem-
ocratic senators." Although this address is cited as the beginning of the "Sec-
23. James Balwin, The American Dream and the American Negro, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COL-
LECTED NONFICtiON 1948-1985 40'-07 (1985).
24. See TiiOMAs BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RAcE RELATIONS
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 160-61 (2003).
25. DUDZiAK, supra note 5, at 153, 168-73.
26. See BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 137 ("Alone among Democratic presidents since 1945,
John Kennedy entered the White House without strong personal feelings about civil rights and racial
discrimination."); DuDZIAK, supra note 5, at 155; CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONcEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HIsroRY OF THE 1964 CrVIL RIGHTS Acr 15 (1985).
27. GRAHAm, supra note 10, at 74; see BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 160-61.
28. BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 160.
29. See id. at 2 ("The essential strategy of American Cold Warriors was to try to manage and
control the efforts of racial reformers at home and abroad, thereby minimizing provocation to the
forces of white supremacy and colonialism while encouraging gradual change."); id. at 138 ("[Ken-
nedy] hoped to keep both black and white Southerners reasonably satisfied with him, while focusing
on his higher priority of stopping Soviet expansionism around the world."); id. at 158 ("Kennedy's
primary concern about the civil rights movement was controlling it- moderating its tactics, channeling
its demands, and limiting the social instability it stirred up in the South.").
30. According to Kennedy's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, American racism was "the biggest
single burden that we carry on our backs in foreign relations." BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 141,
161 (Kennedy's June 11, 1963 speech "reflected both personal revulsion at the violence inflicted on
black Southerners and a determination to get new civil rights legislation passed by Congress in
order-as Robert Kennedy put it-to get 'people off the streets and the situation under control."').
Although I focus on the foreign policy drivers as a primary source for the true purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, there is a nuance here that must not be overlooked. The Kennedy administration
believed deeply in the need to control events and outcomes. Accordingly, Kennedy's main goal, other
motivations aside, was to get the Blacks to stop demonstrating. In order to do this, the administration
promised the traditional civil rights leadership a comprehensive Civil Rights Act.
31. See BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 161.
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ond Reconstruction," 3 2 Kennedy's proposed civil rights act did not address
Black unemployment or underemployment at all.
3
' This failure to focus on the
national problem of job discrimination may be explained by what could and
could not be seen by television cameras. American apartheid in the South was
the international problem because it was being transmitted around the world.
The geopolitical problem was dealing with the obvious racial violence in the
South and not the obvious national problem of Black unemployment.
3
' Ken-
nedy's address to Congress on civil rights on June 19, 1963, fulfilled the prom-
ise he made on June 11 to send Congress omnibus civil rights legislation.
3 5
Between June 11 and 19, the administration's early drafts of the Civil Rights Act
of 1963 did not include any federal fair employment practices titles.
36 The ver-
sion of the administration's bill that was submitted in the House as H.R. 7152
on June 20, 1963 was the first version that mentioned an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in its seventh title.3 7 The sole aim of that version of
Title VII was the prevention of discrimination by government contractors and
subcontractors. 3 8
Because the administration was focused most on what could be seen and
broadcasted, the Civil Rights Act of 1963 as proposed focused on the obvious.
Dealing with the obvious, there was no need to consider the nature of equality
and what equality might mean when applied to the zero-sum game of employ-
ment. Moreover, there was no need to define discrimination or even concep-
tualize it. Even absent a fair employment practices title, the Civil Rights Act of
1963 as proposed had its intended symbolic impact with Kennedy's interna-
tional audience." The foreign policy victory was won by the fact of a proposal
for a Civil Right Act regardless of its content or functionality.4
0
II. CONCEPTUALIZING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Title VII's purpose was not ending Black unemployment and underem-
ployment. In 1963 and 1964 policy makers were aware of the disparities in
unemployment rates between Black and White Americans." Those statistics
provided some impulse for the continued efforts to pass federal fair employ-
ment practices legislation.4 2 Nevertheless, if first class economic citizenship
had been Title VII's goal, the Title could have taken an entirely different "more
efficacious" shape.43 Congress chose a less efficacious means because of the
32. GRAHAM, supfra note 10, at 74.
33. Chuck Henson, Title VI Works-That's Why We Don't Like lt, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & Soc. JIsT. L.
REv. 41, 63-64 (2012).
34. GRAHAM, supra note 10, at 75.
35. See John F. Kennedy, President, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) [hereinafter Report on Civil Rights], https://wwwjfklibrary.org/archives/
other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/civil-rights-radio-and-television-report-19630611.
36. See Civil Rights Act of 1963 Draft, June 13, 1963, JOHN F. KENNEDY: PRF-smErlAL LIBRARY AND
MUSEUM, http://wwwj.fklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-053-00
4
.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2019). This draft included only five titles, none of which addressed employment discrimination. See
id. Another version of the proposed legislation, with a penciled date ofJune 17, 1963, had six titles
and no employment discimination title. See id.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 1 (1963).
38. See id. at 35 ("It shall be the function of the Commission to prevent discrimination against
employees or applicants for employment because of race, color, religion, or national origin by Govern-
ment contractors and subcontractors, and by contractors and subcontractors participating in programs
or activities in which direct or indirect financial assistance by the United States Government is
provided . . . .").
39. See DunzIAK, supra note 5, at 181-82.
40. See id.
41. See H.R. REv. No. 88-570, pt. 2, at 2301 (1963); GRAHAM, supra note 10, at 100-01.
42. See id.
43. Bell, supra note 11, at 681.
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goal was "equality" and "equality" had logical limitations. Equality meant no
special treatment for anyone. Congress was left to conceptualize discrimination
as a means of assuring that from the operative date of Title VII forward no one
received special treatment.
An alternative policy choice existed: recognize that Blacks were innocent in
the discrimination that put them and kept them at the bottom of the economic
ladder. The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education established a sign-
post pointing in this direction. If separate but equal was inherently unequal
because the financial allocation was unequal and led to unequal educational
and social results for Blacks that they were not going to overcome in a segre-
gated society, an argument could have been made that the same principle
applied to the problem of Black unemployment and underemployment.
Although the fix in Brown was the reallocation of economic resources to Blacks
via school integration, the principle remained: equality for Blacks required spe-
cial treatment. Congress could fix the problem by giving Blacks jobs and toler-
ate any discrimination against Whites and others until Black economic
participation mirrored the proportions of White economic participation.'
Politicians did not make this choice for several reasons. First, Kennedy's
announcement of a civil rights policy grounded itself in the concept of simple
equality for all. Second, Black civil rights leaders did not ask for some form of
economic redistribution that some of them saw as a solution because of the
unsavory quality of asking for special treatment. Third, once Kennedy put the
foreign policy goal of creating a symbol of freedom and equality into Congress's
hands, the domestic policy interests of the individual legislators dominated the
project of producing the symbol the administration asked for.
As a matter of domestic policy on the "Negro problem" there was no prece-
dent in America for treating Blacks as equal to Whites. Historically, the
demand for equal treatment was met with failure and, among Whites, resent-
ment of what anything approaching equal for Blacks might mean to the value
of Whiteness." The idea of equality included the idea of there being a limited
amount of equality.4 6 To grant Blacks equality looked like discrimination to
Whites. These dangers of "equality" formed the backbone of the campaign of
"massive resistance" that followed in the wake of Brown to retain what Whites
viewed as equality.4 7 When Kennedy became President the thought of equality
for Black Americans was already a challenge and his inaugural address made
impossible a domestic policy of something more than equality for Blacks. Ken-
nedy said nothing about the lack of equality for Blacks." Kennedy told Ameri-
cans: "[A]sk not what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for
your country." 49 When Kennedy ultimately addressed the nation about civil
rights for Blacks on June 11, 1963, he appealed on behalf of equality knowing
what the challenge granting Blacks equality represented."0
44. Belatedly in 1979, and with a specific claim that the 88th Congress intended Title VII to give
Blacks jobs, this is what the Court ultimately authorized in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979)-private affirmative action that discriminated against whites in favor of Blacks because of a
history of discrimination.
45. See Chuck Henson, Reflections on Ferguson: What's Wrong with Black People, 80 Mo. L. REV. 1013(2015).
46. See id.
47. What Whites viewed as equality is summarized in the "Southern Manifesto" as a constitu-
tional right to maintain segregation; a freedom to continue to exclude Blacks from opportunities open
to Whites. See CAROL ANDERSON, WHIrE RAGE 80-81 (2016).
48. john F. Kennedy, President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), http://www.ourdocuments
.gov/doc.php?doc=91&page=ranscript.
49. Id.
50. See Kennedy, supra note 35; GRAHAM, supra note 10, at 74-75.
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For similar reasons black leaders never asked the administration for the
"far more efficacious means" of correcting the problem of Black unemploy-
ment and underemployment.5 1 Historically, all Blacks ever asked for was equal
treatment.5 2 Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech, for example, elo-
quently defines equality as a rejection of special treatment for Blacks.
5
' For a
moment in the early 1960s, however, so-called militant Blacks in the North
demanded and achieved small successes where White employers agreed to
racially preferential hiring.54 The gravitational pull of the historical demand
for equality, however, required that Blacks, at least the Black civil rights leader-
ship, give no countenance to preferential treatment as reparations for hun-
dreds of years of inequality.5 5 Blacks were trapped by their own demands for
equality.
During hearings in summer 1963 friends and foes of civil rights questioned
witnesses, including the Attorney General Robert Kennedy, about discrimina-
tion in favor of Blacks.56 Whether friend or foe, the questions highlighted the
problem of remedying historical wrongs against Blacks by creating a law that
discriminated against innocent Whites.
5
' Racial quotas were the focal point of
the questions. 8 On the issue of whether civil rights law should remedy employ-
ment imbalances by hiring to quota or to give Blacks special consideration, the
answer had to be and was: "No."59 The logical force of "equality" in many
respects required the 88th Congress to exclude a generation of Black workers
from Title VII's coverage by leaving them without a remedy for the discrimina-
tion they suffered before July 2, 1965. This result was part of how the policy
goal of equality informed the initial conceptualization of discrimination.
A. Conceptualizing Discrimination by Not Defining Discrimination
Title VII does not define "discrimination." It defines prohibited practices
as "unlawful employment practices." It made the primary unlawful employment
practice: "[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or othervise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."'o This is the equality principle. Implicitly, its
statement recognizes equality as a zero-sum concept. Discrimination against a
person because of race captured the idea that discrimination in favor of some-
51. Bell, supra note 11, at 681.
52. The American Blacks' quest for equality, that is, to be considered as a person with the same
rights as all other American citizens is as old as the country. The most prominent and well-known
Black voices about equal treatment include Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. DuBois, and Martin Luther
King. Douglass's What the Black Man Wants speech, for example is a demand for equal treatment
focused on the right to vote. See Three Speeches from Frederick Douglass, FREDEIcKDouG;iASS.ORC., http://
www.frederickdouglass.org/speeches/#wants (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). According to DuBois' first
editorial as Editor of The Crisis magazine, "[lIts editorial page will stand for the rights of men irrespec-
tive of color or race, for the highest ideals of American democracy, and for reasonable but earnest and
persistent attempt to gain these rights and realize the ideals." Editorial, TiHE CRisls, Nov. 1910, at 10,
https://ibrary.brown.edu/pdfs/12747051
7 9 78 1 2 5 .pdf. Similarly, King only ever advocated for equal
treatment. King's 1963 Letter from Birmingham jail and I Have a Dream speeches have equal treatment
for Blacks as their core subjects.
53. Martin Luther King, Address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28,
1963), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/march-washington-jobs-and-freedom.
54. See GRavis, supra note 10, at 104-06.
55. See id. at 120.
56. See id. at 106-09.
57. See id. at 108-09.
58. See id. at 109-10.
59. See id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964) (emphasis added).
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one else occurred at the same time. Congress specifically defined certain
employment practices as lawful. These included what I discuss below as the
"safe-harbors" of Section 703(h): the continuation of existing seniority systems,
an employer's right to use professionally developed general intelligence tests,
and the continued existence of racially imbalanced workforces.6 ' Congress also
made Title VII entirely prospective. Unlawful employment practices could only
happen after July 2, 1965." This represents the conceptualization of discrimi-
nation, not the definition of discrimination.
Policymakers were aware of definitions for discrimination. Testimony in
support of Title VII's predecessor,6 1 the Fair Employment Practices Act of 1963,
defined discrimination in this way:
[E]mployment discrimination against Negroes is defined as any behavior on the
part of an employer toward a Negro employee or potential employee, which
reflects a negative evaluation of that person's race to the extent that the
employer either refuses to utilize that person or underutilizes him, and/or
underpays him.
A simple definition is sufficient. Let us refer to employment discrimination
as any nonobjective behavior on the part of an employer toward an employee or
potential employee, which reflects some intuitive negative evaluation
(prejudice) of the employee's race to the extent that the employer, when con- -
fronted with a manpower need, will either not use the employee, underutilize
him, and/or undercompensate him."'
Given congressional awareness of state fair employment practices laws,6" it
seems reasonable to conclude that policymakers also knew that Missouri had
defined "discrimination" in its law. Missouri's Fair Employment Practices law,
the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), became state law in 1961.66 It
defined "discrimination" in employment as "any unfair treatment based on
race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employ-
ment"67 With potential definitions at hand, the choice against defining "dis-
crimination" in Title VII must have been purposeful. Given the focus on
equality, definitions of discrimination based on "any unfair treatment" or an
analysis of "non-objective behavior" opened doors to the kinds of discrimina-
tion in favor of Blacks the equality principle prohibited, including looking into
the past and tracing the source of any claimed non-objective treatment to the
present. Moreover, in the minds of policymakers, achieving the goal of equality
did not require Title VII to capture all discrimination or trace the discrimina-
tion it condemned to its historical source.
B. Only The "Worst" Forms of Discrimination
When the House reported out its version of Title VII to what would
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it described Title VII as "prohibit[ing] and
61. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703(h), (j), 78 Stat. 241, 257.
62. See 78 Stat. at 266.
63. On July 22, 1963, the House Committee on Education and Labor reported out the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1963. See H.R. REP. No. 88-570, at 2300 (1963). This version of H.R.
405, with minor modifications, replaced Kennedy's proposed Tide VII in H.R. 7152. See id.; see also
FrancisJ. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431, 433 (1966) ("H.R. 405 is
the nominal ancestor of Tide VII.").
64. Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the General Subcomm. of Labor of the Comm. On
Education and Labor, 88th Cong. 198-204 (1963) (testimony of Walter B. Lewis, Director, job Develop-
ment, Washington Urban League).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 88-570, at 2315-16 (1963).
66. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010-137 (2000).
67. Id. § 213.010(6) (emphasis added).
2019] 231
232 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 33
provid[ing] the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimina-
tion."6 8 Members of the House also stated that Title VII "can and will commit
our Nation to the elimination of many of the worst manifestations of racial
prejudice.""9 The "most serious types of discrimination" and "many of the
worst manifestations of racial prejudice" relate most directly to the sectional
nature of the problem the administration was solving. Those phrases described
in short hand what had been happening in the South. The message of Title VII
was therefore also the message of the 1964 Act in support of America's foreign
policy goals. The United States was claiming a national identity, for consump-
tion by the global community, of world leadership arching toward greater racial
justice.o It was doing so by fixing the problems in the South where, as every-
one knew, the "worst" forms of discrimination lived.
Just as the southern stereotype of racial hatred informed the meaning of
the "worst" kinds of action, it defined the intention behind the action. The
most profound discrimination that Americans and the world saw was an inten-
tional action to do harm because of race. The link between action and inten-
tion strongly limits the forms of discrimination that Title VII could recognize.
The discrimination would have to be significant, purposeful, and obvious.
When the word "intentional" made its way into the text of Section 706(g) of
Title VII to modify the right to relief for employment discrimination, this was its
arguable meaning.71 If the discrimination was insignificant, hidden, or inadver-
tent it failed the worst-form-of-discrimination test.7 2
C. Safe Harbors for Historical Discrimination
Although media of the period convincingly portrayed the South as the
home of the "worst" forms of discrimination, refusing jobs to qualified Blacks
and relegating Blacks to the worst jobs with the lowest pay were practiced across
the country by employers and by and within unions.73 It was no secret that
"whites only" signs figuratively hung above jobs and union membership South
and North just as they literally hung above drinking fountains and bathrooms in
the segregated South.74 The problem for legislators was developing a law that
prohibited employment discrimination without discriminating against White
employees or diminishing the rights of White employers in the North.
The compromise legislation that became Title VII managed the problem
by creating safe harbors for all White employers, unions, and White employees.
The safe harbor provisions were the price paid for the essential support of key
northern Republicans to protect their constituencies. Nothing these groups
already had would be taken away. Title VII would not become effective until
68. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2393.
69. IdL at 2488.
70. See BORSTELMANN, supra note 24, at 137.
71. Henson, supra note 33, at 93-96. At the time, the legislators responsible for adding "inten-
tional" to the statute thought little ofit. It merely clarified what everyone understood. 110 CONG. REc.
12,723, 12,724 (1964). Mr. Richard K. Berg, an early scholar of Title VII's legislative history, did not
give any consideration to the meaning of the word "discrimination" in isolation. See Richard K. Berg,
Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REv. 62 (1964). He dis-
cusses discrimination in conjunction with the word "intentionally" to explain why "intentionally" was a
superfluous addition to Tide VII. According to Berg: "Discrimination is by its nature intentional. It
involves both an action and a reason for the action. To discriminate 'unintentionally' on grounds of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin appears a contradiction in terms." Id. at 71. In contrast,
Mr. Berg dismisses, as too remote, the possibility that a subconscious intent to discriminate, that is
submerged in the use of pejorative language, could fall within Title VII's protections. Id. at 71 n.1
4
.
72. 110 CONG. REC. 12,723, 12,724 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey, one of H.R. 7152's
key proponents) (there was no liability for "inadvertent or accidental discriminations").
73. See GRAHAM, supra note 10, at 75.
74. See H.R. Ret'. No. 88-570, at 2300 (1963).
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one year after it became law: July 2, 1965. Only intentional discrimination after
that date would result in liability. Little if any of the past would be relevant in
determining whether intentional discrimination occurred after July 2, 1965.15
Creation of the safe harbors began in the House. H.R. 7152, the bill that
would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was sent to the Senate with the
promise that the EEOC, Title VII's watchdog, would work on a short leash:
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities to
correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In this
regard, nothing in this [T]itle permits a person to demand employment. Of
greater importance, the Commission will onlyjeopardize its continued existence
if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers and labor unions.
Similarly, management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must
not be interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in
discrimination practices.7 6
This statement represents the consensus viewpoint of the House.7 7 The
Senate followed the House's lead by dealing with the issues of management
right to use tests to make employment decisions and by giving unions and their
membership explicit protection.
The Senate created safe harbors by defining what were not unlawful
employment practices. Senators added Section 703(h) to Title VII and
excepted differential treatment related to bonafide seniority systems and the use
of professionally developed ability tests from Title VII's coverage.7 8 According
to Section 703(h), different benefits available to employees arising from
existing bonafide seniority systems are not unlawful employment practices cov-
ered by Title VII "provided that such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate . . . ."7 Shortly after passage of the Act, one commentator
remarked that "Congress went out of its way to protect established seniority
rights from the bite of Title VII's provisions, even though these rights may have
been acquired as a result of prior discrimination."8 0 Senators Case and Clark,
advocating for Title VII, assured their colleagues that established seniority
rights could not be touched by Title VII because "[i]ts effect is prospective and
not retrospective."s" According to these senators:
... if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an
all-White working force, when the [T]itle comes into effect the employer's obli-
gation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He
would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire Whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes are hired,
to give them special seniority rights at the expense of White workers hired
earlier.82
The safe harbor for bona fide seniority systems met the purpose of the
northern politicians to "blunt the impact of the bill on the North and to lower
75. See Berg, supra note 71, at 77 (discussing whether it was even rational for employers to be
concerned about achieving racial balance in their work forces because of Title V1l and observing that
"the employer's practices prior to the effective date of the Title and the composition of his work force
on that date should be of only limited relevance, perhaps suggesting a disposition to discriminate, but
not sufficient to destroy the ordinary presumption that he is complying with the law").
76. H.R. RF.P. No. 88-914, at 2516 (1963) (emphasis added).
77. See Vaas, supra note 63, at 437.
78. See id. at 449; Berg, supra note 71, at 74.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, : 703(h), 78 Star. 241, 257.
80. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laos Against Discrimina-
tion: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817, 839 (1967).
81. Id. at 839 n.55 (quoting 110 CONc. REc. 7213 (1964)).
82. See id.
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the perceived costs of the Act to Republican constituents."
3 Racial imbalance
in any work force received similar protections in Section 703(j).8 ' At the time
no one thought these "clarifications" effected a functional change to Title
VII.85
The seniority system exemption and the prohibition of quotas have an
obvious and direct connection to the accepted concept of equality. These addi-
tions to Title VII focus on individuals who, for political reasons, must be held
harmless in making equality of employment opportunity the law: White work-
ers.
8 6 Less conspicuous in the legislative history is the freedom granted to
employers in determining the composition of their workforces. The Senate
amplified this freedom within Title VII by specifically protecting the use of
intelligence tests.
The trigger for senators to protect testing in Title VII came from an Illinois
state fair employment practices case which came down as the Senate was debat-
ing Title VII.8 7 In Myart v. Motorola, Inc.," Myart alleged that Motorola did not
hire him because he was black." One of Motorola's defenses was it did not hire
Myart because he failed Motorola's Test No. 10, a general intelligence test.:o
Motorola did not produce Myart's actual test or the Motorola employee who
administered Myart's test at the hearing."' Myart testified that he had passed
Test No. 10. Motorola produced the test's author,
9 2 
who testified that it was the
shortest test he knew of to test verbal comprehension and ability to understand
instructions.s The hearing officer, finding for Myart, enjoined Motorola from
using Test No. 10. According to the hearing officer, Test No. 10 was obsolete
and had the effect of disadvantaging minority applicants regardless of intent.
9
[Test No. 10's] norm was derived from standardization on advantaged groups.
Studies in inequalities and environmental factors since the publication of test
No. 10 [in 1949] have been made with careful equating of such background
factors .... [T]his test does not lend itself to equal opportunity to qualify for the
hitherto culturally deprived and the disadvantaged groups.
9 5
In addition to ordering Motorola to cease and desist from using Test No.
10, the hearing officer ordered that, should the company replace the test, any
replacement "shall reflect and equate inequalities and environmental factors
83. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1471-72, 1487
(2003).
84. Berg, supra note 71, at 76.
85. See id. at 73 (the additions of protections for bona fide seniority systems and testing do not
"involve[ ] a substantive change in the [T]itle."); id. at 76 ("Section 703 (j) is another clarifying provi-
sion effecting no substantive change.").
86. Winter, supra note 80, at 840-42 (criticizing Congress for failing to attack unions and senior-
ity systems because of unions' history of racism and the fact that seniority systems are not neutral as to
race). "It is the dead hand of racial prejudice governing present relationships and is of value to no
one except its direct beneficiaries." Id. at 842.
87. See Berg, supra note 71, at 74.
88. A text of the examiner's report reprinted in 110 CONo. REc. 5662-64 (1964).
89. Id. at 5662.
90. See id. at 5663.
91. See id.
92. "Dr. Shurrager developed a series of test for [Motorola, including Test No. 10,] including
tests of four different kinds of special relations and ability; and he regularly supplies these tests to
[Motorola] for a fee. Id.
93. Id. at 5664.
94. Id.
95. Id.
THE PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
among the disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups.""6 The hearing
officer also ordered Motorola to employ Myart. 7
The Senate made sure that the Myart result, a remedy for the present
effects of historical discrimination, could not happen under Title VIL" The
Senate leadership accepted an amendment by Senator Tower to Title VII, and
the following language ultimately appeared in Section 703(h): "nor shall it be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate . . . ."9 The Tower amendment
going largely unremarked can be explained by the notion that if Title VII guar-
anteed anything, it only guaranteed the equal opportunity to compete, regard-
less of history.o Thus, this exchange between Senator Dirksen, who had filed
objections, and Senator Clark, one of the leading Democrats tasked with the
passage of the omnibus civil rights legislation:
Objection: Under the bill, employers will no longer be able to hire or pro-
mote on the basis of merit and performance.
Answer: Nothing in the bill will interfere with merit hiring or merit promo-
tion. The bill simply eliminates consideration of color from the decision to hire
or promote. 10 1
The employer's ability to test was an unobjectionable part of existing man-
agement prerogatives,' 0 2 which "expressly protects the employer's right to insist
that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job
qualifications."' 0 3
Because compensation for past discrimination was not part of the 1964
Act's purpose, it also made sense for Title VII to reject racial quotas as a mea-
sure of the presence or absence of discrimination. The Senate's addition of
Section 703(j), 104 prohibiting the use of quotas, reflected, again, the consensus
view of equality and limited the potential liability to employers with racially
imbalanced work forces.
96. Jd.
97. Id. Myart's compensatory demand was for employment, with back-pay, and seniority from
the date of his application. Id. at 5662. Seen as a declaration that facially neutral tests cannot be used
to reject "disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups" unless the tests account for "inequalities and
environmental factors," the hearing officer's decision in Myarl and the Court's decision in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. are effectively identical. Imbedded in the hearing officer's pronouncements of cultural
deprivation and inequalities lay the Grggs Court's reasoning that the educational, and therefore occu-
pational, disparities caused by segregation could not be allowed to be frozen in time by a facially
neutral test that did not really test a person's ability to do ajob, but instead tested the person himself.
Fully aware of, Myarl, Congress could have signaled its intent to allow for the Griggs result by either
remaining silent or by enacting a section that prohibited testing on any other basis than an applicant
or employee's ability to perform a specific job.
98. See Berg, supra note 71, at 74.
99. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257.
100. Compare Berg, supra note 71, at 74 (seeing the Tower amendment as largely irrelevant, and
"[sJince the amendment did not effect a change in the previous meaning of the [T]itle, no negative
implication may be drawn from the reference to a 'professionally developed ability test'"), with Vaas,
supra note 63, at 449 (perceiving what the logic of Myart portended: "The amendment is limited to an
employer's use of such tests. Does this leave the door open for the EEOC or for a court to hold that
use of such a test by an employment agency ... is an unfair employment practice if it results in "de facto
discrimination," and the user knows or should have known that this would be the result?").
101. 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964).
102. Berg, supra note 71, at 74-75 ("Since the amendment did not effect a change in the previ-
ous meaning of the [T]itle, no negative implication may be drawn from the reference to a 'profession-
ally developed ability test.' The issue in any case where the use of any ability test is questioned is not
whether the test is professionally developed . . . but whether it is used in good faith or with intent to
discriminate.").
103. Berg, supra note 71, at 74 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7,026 (1964)).
104. See 78 Stat. at 257.
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Each of these carve-outs from the spectrum of unlawful employment prac-
tices accurately reflected the national consensus and national insecurity about
the meaning of the equality principle. Equal meant equality of opportunity to
compete in a race for economic advantage set to begin on July 2, 1965. No
advantage gained by Whites before the 1964 Act would be taken away. What
Whites might lose, however, was what the legislators bargained over and sought
to protect: existingjobs, economic benefits and expectations that resulted from
Blacks being excluded from the employment marketplace. Oddly, legislators
spent no time debating how Blacks might best compete given a history of dejure
and defacto policies meant to exclude Blacks from even preparing to compete.
These policy choices became focal points for commentators and scholars in the
years immediately after the Act's passage. Yet no scholar in the period between
1964 and 1973, the year the Court decided McDonnell Douglas, connected the
specific safe harbors of Section 703(h), seniority system protection, and the
right to use tests, to the specific legislative compromise captured in the House
Report: existing "management prerogatives and union freedoms are to be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible."
0
"' Rather than "clarifying redun-
dancies," the Section 703 safe harbors were cornerstones that could not be
shifted without disturbing the 88th Congress's overarching vision of limiting
Title VII liability to violations of the equality principle.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING DISCRiMINATION
Immediately after its passage scholars and commentators went to work ana-
lyzing Title VII. With varying degrees of approbation, anger, disappointment,
and concern, they revealed their expectations about what Title VII was sup-
posed to do in contrast with the scheme the 88th Congress produced.
Although some appreciated Title VII because of its existence, all agreed that it
was too obviously a piece of compromise legislation with a dim future. Several
saw that conceptualizing discrimination in Title VII around the equality princi-
ple set up a fatal conflict with any purpose the Title may have had beyond sym-
bolism. One of the era's major scholars of employment discrimination,
Professor Michael I. Sovern, wrote that Title VII was only a small beginning to
"[b] ringing the Negro to full economic citizenship."'o It was a beginning that,
in 1966, would not cover ninety-two percent of employers or sixty percent of
employees by the time its mandate grew from employers of one-hundred or
more to employers of twenty-five or more.
1 0 7 Moreover, the equality principle
would only garner jobs for qualified Blacks in an increasingly technological,
white-collar workspace from which most Blacks would be "permanently disquali-
fied" because of a history of inferior education.'
08
For those reasons, the search for a purpose beyond symbolism for Title VII
became focused on spaces where the equality principle would not be chal-
lenged, and some jobs still existed which Blacks might, more or less, immedi-
105. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2 at 29 (1963).
106. MICHAEL. 1. SOVERN, LE;Al. RESTRAINTS ON RAcAL DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 5 (1966).
107. See id. at 65. Commenting on Title ViI's grace periods of covering employers with one-
hundred or more employees on July 2, 1965 and only reaching employers of twenty-five or more
employees on July 2 1968, Sovern pointed out the likelihood of dashed expectations for Blacks:
The unheralded delays are obviously pregnant with embittering surprises for Negrojob appli-
cants who think that American business and labor are supposed to be treating them fairly
now. It will be difficult to explain to a Negro turned away in the spring of 1967, by a business
large enough to require [seventy-four] employees, why the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cannot
help him yet.
Id.
108. Id. at 5.
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ately fill despite the crippling effects of their substandard education. The
search for a purpose which met these criteria led scholars directly to unions and
the Section 703(h) safe harbor for seniority systems. Exploring Title VII's inter-
nal tensions, however, scholars and commentators exposed all of Section
703(h)'s safe harbors as valid subjects for an in-depth review of the scope of the
equality principle. In so doing, they laid the groundwork for a reconceptualiza-
tion of discrimination where Title VII might capture the present effects of his-
torical discrimination in all employment decisions.
A. Finding Title VII's Purposes
Some scholars and commentators saw the existence of Title VII as a symbol
of where the country stood on invidious racial discrimination as an achieve-
ment. One early historian celebrated Title VII for its educational value: "As an
expression of congressional and national concern over the problem of discrimi-
nation in employment, Title VII [was] indeed unprecedented."' According to
another scholar, however, "[t]he educative impact of anti-discrimination pro-
grams is not, therefore, unidirectional. What they teach in the way of tolerance
is matched by their ability to mislead as to the causes and remedies for Negro
poverty."110 Another concluded that Congress's work "brought to fruition the
labors and aspirations of civil rights proponents everywhere, [and] made possi-
ble that which has never before been possible in America and will leave a lasting
mark on the structure of American society.""' At least one of these scholars,
however, noted that Title VII's enforcement procedures "[bore] only too visibly
the marks of compromise, and seem . . . to contain serious deficiencies.""'
Private lawsuits were unlikely to do much because defendants would have the
upper hand in resources and information and individual plaintiffs would find
the litigation too burdensome under the best circumstances. 1 s Title VII's
effectiveness largely depended on the climate of opinion regarding racial dis-
crimination in society.' 4 Even Franklin D. Roosevelt,Jr., the first Chairman of
the newly minted EEOC, by calling to business and unions to go beyond the
letter of the law, admitted that Title VII did not "right ancient wrongs" or "undo
the damage done by 250 years of slavery and 100 years of segregation.""'
Other scholars analyzed Title VII through a philosophical lens: what was
the law's proper role in equal employment opportunity? Some concluded that
laws like Title VII had a role to play' 16 but questioned what that role should be
in relation to the equality principle. Others thought Title VII unwise because it
seemed to set unmeetable expectations about resolving the economic issues for
Blacks because of its basis in the equality principle."' There was disagreement
about the application of the equality principle to some, all, or none of the
issues Title VII touched. Several of these commentators, however, agreed on
109. Berg, supra note 71, at 96.
110. Winter, supra note 80, at 855.
Ill. Vaas, supra note 63, at 457.
112. Berg, supra note 71, at 96.
113. See id. at 96-97.
114. See id.
115. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Introduction, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 413, 414 (1966).
116. See Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. INoUS. & COM. L. REv.
459, 471-72 (1966) ("Although I am pessimistic about the overall effects of Title VII . . . this in no way
suggests that I view racial discrimination in the world of work as not being subject to effective legisla-
tion, nor am I reluctant to suggest additional legislation."); see also Frank Cloud Cooksey, The Role of
Law in Equal Employment Ofportunity, 7 B.C. INous. & COM. L. REV. 417, 417 (1966) ("[T]he law may be
used as an effective tool in eliminating some unreasonable discrimination in the area of hiring and
other employment practices.").
117. See Winter, supra note 80, at 821.
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facts relating to the lack ofjob preparedness Blacks suffered in the 1960s which
do not reveal themselves in Title VII's legislative history or in any part of the
Title."' In sum, these observers saw that Title VII's value was symbolic."' It
did nothing to solve the problem of Black joblessness. It did nothing to solve
the problem of Blackjob-preparedness. Title VII's only purpose appeared to be
imbedding the equality principle in federal law, with the serious side effect of
prohibiting any form of targeted benefits for Blacks.
According to one outraged commentator, Title VII was a complete failure
because it embraced the equality principle.' 2 0 It had no value even as a sym-
bol.'"' He saw Title VII as a measure to correct ideas about discrimination
largely through conciliation and a hope that employers and unions would go
beyond the letter of the law.'" But, he believed that there was no time to wait
for America to change its racial attitudes and that compliance with the letter of
the law was unlikely.' 2 3 Moreover, Title VII was deeply flawed in its focus on
the equality principle.' 24 It was flawed because it did not deal with the problem
of Black joblessness and economic hardship by giving only Blacks special treat-
ment.12 5 Title VII should have either required hiring to quotas or compelled
industry and unions to "assume the employment training responsibility of the
Negro."'26
Another commentator found Title VII flawed for purposes of ending
"unreasonable" employment discrimination in a timely manner because of the
inherent problems with evidence and its sluggish process.'
2  He suggested that
Title VII, as it stood, could be useful in eliminating "the more overt types of
discrimination" but it would need revision and enforcement to "be a catalyst in
the process of reducing the more covert discriminatory practices."'
2 8 On the
other hand, this commentator recognized a primary problem Title VII was
never meant to fix: job preparedness. To him "it appear[ed] axiomatic that the
118. See SOVERN, supra note 106, at 5.
119. See Winter, supra note 80, at 855 ("We are relatively unpracticed at using law as a moral
symbol rather than as a coercive device."). Winter concluded that Title Vii was a failure as a coercive
device and as a symbol because of its conflicting goals, fixing Black economic deprivation and the
equality principle. But see SOVERN, supra note 106, at 101 ("In the meantime, Title VII, for all its
limitations, is far more than a symbol, at least in states that have not yet enacted fair employment
practices legislation."). Title VII is an irreversible beginning that will get better as Black political influ-
ence increases and resistance to equal employment opportunity diminishes. See id.
120. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 459 ("In my eyes, this [T]itle is wholly inadequate to meet
even the minimum demands of the Negro, being ill-conceived in scope, coverage, administration, and
enforcement.").
121. See id.
122. See id. at 461-62. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., the first Chairman of the EEOC agreed with
this assessment of Title VII. Roosevelt, supra note 115, at 413-14 ("Our appeal is that business go
beyond the letter of the law in order to carry out the spirit of the law.")
123. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 460 ("[T]he Negro in America has been mediating and
conciliating for over 150 years. He has little faith in the process, nor should he!"); see also Roosevelt,
supra note 115, at 414 ("There will be no social peace unless we right ancient wrongs. That requires us
to undo the damage done by 250 years of slavery and 100 years of segregation.").
124. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 459-60 ("The problem in civil rights is the Negro-the prob-
lem in job discrimination is the Negro-the problem in unemployment is the Negro-the problem in
skilled craft unions is the Negro-the problem in apprenticeship and training is the Negro .... How-
ever, Title VII does not exclusively focus upon the Negro. In fact, some have even expressed this lack
of focus as being one of the outstanding virtues of the [T]itle. They argue that by requiring merit
employment and non-restrictive membership provisions along very broad lines . . . that we may 'pack-
age' the American ideal of equal opportunity into one convenient container. To me, this is equivalent
to treating a cancer with aspirin because you also happen to have a headache, a sore toe, and a
hangnail!").
125. See id. at 472.
126. Id.
127. See Cooksey, supra note 116, at 419-20.
128. Id. at 420.
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first obstacle to be overcome by Negroes in their search for equal employment
opportunity is the achievement of the education and training necessary to per-
form the increasingly demanding tasks of a technologically sophisticated soci-
ety."1 29 Given the equality principle, however, there could be no argument for
"favored treatment" to excuse the lack of qualification for a given job. 30
Others doubted anti-discrimination law generally, Title VII in particular,
because of its fatally simplistic view of discrimination and the tension between
equal treatment and solving Black economic suffering. The overly simplistic
view of discrimination based on eliminating the decision-making of a racist
employer supported the existence of legislation that was "vague, both in princi-
ple and in practice" and could not be properly critiqued "without seeming a
racist."' 3" A more complex discussion of what form of discrimination was limit-
ing Black economic opportunity included consumer bias against Blacks, co-
worker bias, the absence of Blacks in the labor pool, the absence of qualified
Blacks, and the absence of apparently qualified Blacks.' 32 Title VII's hyper
focus on racially motivated employers overstated the impact of that type of dis-
crimination and set irrational expectations about the Title's ability to influence
the economic picture for Black Americans.' 3 Title VII as constructed was
based on the treatment of individuals. Individual cases of discrimination were
not going to put "substantial numbers of Negroes to work."' 34 The only
method of putting substantial numbers of Blacks in jobs, thereby meeting the
expectations Title VII created, would be quotas and preferential hiring whether
adopted voluntarily to avoid claims of discrimination or imposed judicially.' 3 5
This scholar also specifically criticized the Act for purposefully missing the
opportunity to address well known and more readily tractable union discrimina-
tion. 13  Most problematic was Title VII's protection of seniority systems. Sec-
tion 703(h) was a mistake based on an overly simplistic view of seniority systems
and political fear of "antagonizing those beneficiaries [of seniority systems] and
of disrupting relationships."'1 7 The mistaken view was that seniority systems
were race neutral when they actually were racially driven by a documented his-
tory of racial discrimination.'3 Unions, not capitalists, were the problem since
"the principal economic beneficiaries of discrimination against Negro workers
are white [unionized] workers . . . .""' Rather than create a law that might
allow the white unions and management to merge separately maintained
seniority lists by simply putting the Black list at the bottom," Title VII would
have been a good place to suspend the equality principle and grant Blacks spe-
cial treatment."' In conclusion, without preferential treatment for Blacks,
129. Id. at 418.
130. See id. at 419 ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly rejected a course of preferential
treatment.").
131. Winter, supra note 80, at 824.
132. See id. at 822-24.
133. See id. at 826.
134. Id. at 834-35.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 838-44.
137. Id. at 842.
138. See id. at 841 ("I suspect that if one were to attempt to catalogue the industries from which
Negroes are most systematically excluded, they would be those in which unions do control hiring.
Since many of these have traditionally served as the pipeline for ethnic group betterment, the labor
movement must be held responsible for some of the most pernicious bottlenecks preventing Negro
advancement.").
139. Id. at 840.
140. See id. at 841 n.62 ("I don't mean to suggest that Title VIl necessarily permits the parties tojoin previously separate seniority lists by putting the Negro list at the bottom. That is not clear. It is
clear, however, that Congress went out of its way to render this a permissible interpretation.").
141. See id. at 842-43.
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Title VII would not have a positive economic impact for Blacks and preferential
treatment could not be engaged in because of the many negative impacts
including backlash and yielding the moral principle of the civil rights
movement.
1 4 2
One scholar focused exclusively on the equality principle and its conflict
with special treatment for Blacks.14 s After rehearsing the arguments in favor of
violating the equality principle, he concluded that special treatment was unten-
able as a solution to Black joblessness. 1'" In particular, this observer argued
that preferences for Blacks underestimated the group that needed preferences:
Gunnar Myrdal's "underclass." 4 5 All Americans without an adequate share of
society's benefits, "the self-perpetuating group at the bottom level of our society
who have lost the ability and the hope of moving up" only one third of which
were Black, comprised the underclass. 146 By preferring Blacks, the majority of
the underclass paid the price without having benefitted from the exclusion of
Blacks from American economic life.'4 7 Inserting the equality principle into
the law was already problematic. The members of the underclass who would be
"most affected by job preference for the Negro would be the second generation
Americans and poor whites who have most bitterly resented his march toward
equality."' 4 8 They would not well tolerate changing places with Blacks.'
4 9 For
this scholar, Title VII's best purpose was symbolic, although he does not men-
tion the title by name. The educative force on "public opinion as to the moral-
ity of discrimination" was "more important than the actual enforcement
mechanisms of the law."' Similar to the conflicting goals of equal treatment
and curing Blacks' economic deprivation, the goal of convincing America of
the immorality of discrimination stood in conflict with any preferential treat-
ment for Blacks.1 5'
This scholar also discussed what was not, in his mind, preferential treat-
ment for Blacks.1 52 As with other scholars, he focused on unions and Black
exclusion from the information pipeline about job openings and training
opportunities."' On the relationship between unions and Black unemploy-
ment: "Over the years the Negro has been the victim of deliberate racial dis-
crimination which has drastically limited his numbers in most positions and in
142. Id. at 854-55. See also SOVERN, supra note 106, at 211-12 (condemning "compensatory dis-
crimination" as engaging in group "stereotypy" rejection of which "rests most fittingly on the very
principle that has enlightened the long fight over civil rights-the individual is entitled to be judged
on his own merits").
143. John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363 (1966).
144. See id. at 387.
145. See id. at 374.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 375.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 375-76.
150. Id. at 379.
151. See id. at 380.
152. See id. at 368 ("Before discussing the first of our questions-the extent to which the govern-
ment could compel private employers to give preference to Negroes-it is appropriate to delineate
one area in which the questions of preference are more apparent than real."). But see Winter, supra
note 80, at 844 (dealing with unions on issues like seniority and outreach through coercive law
"involves preferential treatment of a kind, but there is little harm in that when imposed on such a
monopolistic system").
153. Kaplan, supra note 143, at 368; see also Winter, supra note 80, at 843-44 ("Where unions
have control overjob assignments through hiring halls and apprenticeship programs, moreover, there
seems to be no reason to permit them to apply whatever subjective standards they desire.... Moreo-
ver, I see no objection to requiring holders of this power aggressively to seek out applicants from
previously excluded groups with a view toward demonstrating that opportunities are now available to
qualified applicants.").
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most industries."'14 Unions may continue to discriminate against Blacks by
admitting members on grounds directly linked to historical discrimination like
familial ties or the personal endorsement of existing members without a pre-
sent reference to race.' 5 5 He argued that there should be a remedy for histori-
cal discrimination in the present, "[w]herever the factor which prevents the
admission of the Negro to a union is caused in some sense by that union's
previous discrimination, it is certainly neither difficult nor unfair to insist on
the use of some other method which does not incorporate a prior discrimina-
tion."'" Nor would it be preferential treatment to remedy the related system
ofjob access based on insider information where employers who trust word of
mouth referrals from an entirely or predominately white workforce to fill vacan-
cies perpetuates historical discrimination.1 5 7  Nevertheless, according to the
critic who addressed the issue of enforcing any such remedy, "[t]he possibility
of imposing such controls under [Title VII] is not great" because of the Title's
requirement of a "specific intent to discriminate on racial grounds."'1 5
Title VII as written could only successfully serve a symbolic purpose.
America had formally embraced the equality principle in federal law. Because
of the equality principle, Title VII could not meet the expectations the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 created about an immediate resolution of the economic
imperilment of Blacks. That remedy led down the road of race-based prefer-
ences; a road blocked by the equality principle. Even if Title VII allowed for
preferences based on race, it could not succeed in remedying the economic
plight of Black Americans because the title did not contemplate the problem of
Blackjob-preparedness without which Blacks would not succeed in the jobs they
were given. On the other hand, unions and seniority systems presented fertile
ground for remediation because the equality principle arguably was not in con-
flict with eliminating the present effects of their historical discrimination. The
questions remained: How could such a remedy be created and, if created, how
would it be proved?
B. Finding a Remedy for the Present Effects of Historical Discrimination
Primary architects of the arguments that Title VII could, despite its lan-
guage and apparent intent, reach into the past and adjust for the present
effects of historical discrimination were Professor Michael I. Sovern and an
unknown Harvard Law School student.' 59 Professor Sovern provided the solu-
154. Kaplan, supra note 143, at 368 (citing Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1962)).
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 369.
158. Winter, supra note 80, at 844.
159. Another primary architect was Professor Alfred W. Blumrosen who was publishing ideas
similar to the ones discussed in this section between 1967 and 1969 and assembled his ideas in the
1971 book Black Employment and the Law. I do not highlight Professor Blumrosen because the seminal
cases creating remedies for the present effects of historical discrimination beginning with Quartesfocus
on Professor Sovern and the Harward Law Review Note.
Similar to Professor Sovern, Blumrosen captured the racist history of unions and described in
detail how that history was discrimination that was being perpetuated in the present. See ALED W.
BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAw (1971). He posed the question in relation to Title VII:
"In other words, has [a system where Blacks lose their seniority when they move to white departments]
discriminated during the post July 2, 1965, period, or did the discrimination cease when the formal
barriers to promotion were lifted?" Id. at 170. According to Blumrosen, the discrimination continued
in the present. See id. at 170-71. Professor Blumrosen wrote in some detail about the arguments for
and against the idea that Titie VII covered the present effects of historical discrimination in union
seniority systems. See id. at 172-90. One of the key arguments that Titie VII did not cover the present
effects of historical discrimination was that it could not be applied retroactively. According to Blum-
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tion to the issue of how discrimination could be proved. The unknown
Harvard student explained specifically how seniority should be dealt with with-
out violating the equality principle.
Professor Sovern described his ideas about the union discrimination prob-
lem in a 1962 article in the Columbia Law Review titled The National Labor Rela-
tions Act and Racial Discrimination.'c He later amplified these ideas in a 1966
book, Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination,
6 1 to account for Title VII; the
arrival of which he did not foresee.1 6 2 In 1962 he did not believe that Congress
would "enact a comprehensive program in the near future" to deal with Black
unemployment and underemployment."'s Aside from the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA"), federal law in the area of employment discrimination was a
"collection of makeshifts."1 6 4 And dealing with discrimination against Blacks by
unions made sense because of the power of labor unions "to maintain or end
discrimination."16' Unions had a history of refusing Blacks membership, rele-
gating them to segregated locals, and most importantly, they used their "power
to confine Negroes to the lowest job classifications of some enterprises and to
exclude them from others altogether."'
6
Professor Sovern explored how the NLRA could stop these practices partic-
ularly under Sections 8(b) (2) (prohibiting unions from trying to make employ-
ers discriminate on the basis of union membership) and 8(b) (3) (prohibiting
employers from encouraging or discouraging union membership) and the duty
of fair representation.1 6 7 He created a catalogue of the numerous methods
unions used to discriminate against Blacks including denial of membership
because of race and denial of employment because they were not union mem-
bers.16 s His contribution in sketching out the numerous ways these exclusions
operated as the dead hand of prior discrimination without appearing to be race
based is shown in the cases that later explored arguments that unions and
employers changed their policies and were complying with Title VII afterJuly 2,
1965.169
Arguing that Sections 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (3) should apply to race discrimina-
tion, Sovern observed that the road to employment, employment security, and
rosen, this argument rested on the premise that Congress intended to protect the acts done prior to
July 2, 1965 and the specific seniority systems that existed at the time. Thus, "retroactivity purports to
give a privilege to continue to discriminate in seniority systems after the effective date of Title VII as
long as the discrimination started earlier." Id. at 179. Blumrosen argued that in the absence of a
clearly articulated license to do so, Congress could not have intended to privilege continued discrimi-
nation. This is the same gap in documentation that the Harvard Law Reuiew Note identified and the
Quarles decision took advantage of to create a Title VII remedy for the current impacts of historical
discrimination.
160. See Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 563 (1962).
161. See SovEPN, supra note 106.
162. Professor Sovern's Legal Restraints represents his effort to catalogue the varieties of laws and
agencies, including the newly enacted Tide VlI and the newly created EEOC, focused on the issue of
employment discrimination at the time. Chapter 4 of Legal Restraints "Congress at Last: The Civil
Rights Act of 1964" contains his discussion of Title VII particularly its flaws. Chapter 6, "The National
Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts" is substantially Professor Sovern's NLRA article. Professor
Sovern accepts the premise of the equality principle, noting that its inclusion in Section 703(j) is a
redundancy meant to reassure and dispel misunderstanding because "nothing in the Act would have
supported an interpretation" allowing preferential treatment for Blacks. Id. at 70.
163. Sovern, supra note 160, at 564.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 565.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 566.
168. See id. at 567-69.
169. See id. at 571-72.
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economic wellbeing led through the union and the union hiring hall.170 Prior
discrimination could be a potent deterrent for Blacks attempting to join lily-
white unions or approaching their hiring halls.' 7 ' So deterred, it would be
hard to find complaining parties to bring cases to test the level of continuing
race discrimination.' 7 2 Turning to the discrimination where a white union rep-
resented Black and white workers to the detriment of Black workers, Professor
Sovern proposed a basic assumption that a union that excludes Blacks does not
represent their interests.17 3 Therefore, in response to claims of discrimination,
the "burden of proving justification should be on the union .1.7. 7 A claim-
ant's prima facie case to force the burden of proof to the union would consist
of being Black and proving the union excluded Blacks from membership in the
past.' 75 Sovern, in effect, provided the solution to the problem of proving dis-
criminatory intent: always assume present discrimination based on a history of
discrimination and make the discriminator prove "that they have done the
unlikely when their actions are challenged."@7
In 1966, Professor Sovern published Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimina-
tion.'7 7 The book expanded the discussion he began in his NLRA article to
reconcile all laws relating to employment discrimination. His commentary
about the safe-harbors largely repeated the assurances of the policy makers that
the actions specifically excluded from the definition of discrimination were
reassuring redundancies. 7 8 Most significant to this discussion, he posed the
problem of employment discrimination against Blacks as one of "[b] ringing the
Negro to full economic citizenship."' 7 Although he accepted the equality
principle, he acknowledged that because of inferior education, equal employ-
ment opportunity on the basis of "merit alone" would not change anything.'
Despite highlighting the proposition that "merit alone" could not move the
needle to full economic citizenship, Professor Sovern did not abandon the
equality principle. He framed it in a way that eliminated any argument that
included notoriously race linked secondary characteristics. He wrote: "To vio-
late Title VII, one must treat differently because of race itself and not merely
because of an applicant's lack of a qualification which he was prevented from
acquiring because of his race.""' Professor Sovern, however, noted two issues
about the safe harbors in Section 703(h): that courts could ignore the present
effects of prior discrimination in seniority systems; and the preservation of the
right to test using ability tests requiring a high degree of literacy when the job
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 572.
173. See id. at 582.
174. Id.
175. See id. Professor Sovern made identical arguments under the duty of fair representation.
He proposed that Blacks could challenge union recognition for purposes of collective bargaining. He
argued that "[a] union's refusal to admit Negroes is highly probative evidence that it will be unwilling
or unable to represent them fairly." Id. at 600. The "refusal to admit Negroes" included denial of
membership and segregation of Blacks into "a colored local." Id. Therefore, "once a union has been
shown to exclude Negroes from membership, fair representation seems so improbable that the union
should have the burden of adducing evidence that it will represent Negroes in the bargaining unit
fairly." Id.
176. Id. at 632. Cf BLUMROSEN, supra note 159, at 172-76 (arguing that because Tide VII is a
body of "statutory tort law" intent is not evil motive, but an awareness of the consequence of actions.
Thus, the absence of continuing intent to discriminate does not immunize an employer or a union
from Title VII liability if they continue to grant seniority system benefits that perpetuate past harms).
177. See SOVERN, supra note 106.
178. See id. at 70.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 71.
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has no such requirement would disadvantage Blacks. On the latter issue, Pro-
fessor Sovern noted that Title VII's permission to use such tests should not dis-
able the EEOC from persuading employers "to use tests better suited to [the
performance of the job in question] and less likely to heap an additional disad-
vantage on the Negro product of a segregated school system."'
8 2
Following Professor Sovern, an unnamed Harvard Law School student
wrote a Note titled Title VZi, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro,
which focused on the specific problem of how Title VII should deal with the
expectations of white workers that their seniority rights, established under dis-
criminatory seniority systems, will remain in force.
1 8
' The Note's Author, like
prior commentators, held the view that dealing with the problem of seniority
did not challenge the equality principle. Arguing that Blacks' seniority should
entitle them to assume their "rightful place" in line for jobs that would open in
the future:
Title VII should not be seen as [preferential treatment] since they do not accel-
erate the advancement of Negroes simply because of their race; rather, they pre-
fer them only if they are senior employees who have been denied advancement
which, absent discrimination, their length of service would have secured for
them.'1 4
She or he did not accept the proposition that the 88th Congress had cre-
ated a safe harbor for all seniority systems. Despite Congress having "[gone]
out of its way"1 8 5 to protect all seniority systems and benefits prior to July 2,
1965, the Note's Author simply found it incredible that Title VII "provid[ed] a
blanket exemption for all differences in treatment resulting from seniority
arrangements set up [before that date]."' 8 The Note's Author reasoned that
Title VII's legislative history did not cover the issue of incumbent, as opposed to
new, Black employees. Congress's failure to create a record on this issue, cou-
pled with the Title's purpose as "a response to congressional concern over the
depressed economic status of the Negro in American society,"187 meant that a
bona fide seniority system protected by Section 703(h) could not cause Title VII
to "exclude from its protection the generation of Negroes who have worked
under discriminatory systems."" A bona fide seniority system excludes such
discriminatory impacts because those impacts are the result of the discrimina-
tory intent that went into creating them.
80 On balance, the Author of the
Note concluded that white workers would retain most of the benefits of past
discrimination, their current jobs and their economic gains.' 9 0 A "rightful
182. Id. at 73.
183. See Note, Tite VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L, REv. 1260
(1967) [hereinafter The Note] (identifying the writer as "the Author of the Note" or "the Note's
Author"). Although there is no specific reference to the issue Professor Sovern raised about the mean-
ing of Section 703(h), Sovern's concern that Congress's failure to discuss "the problem of the Negro
who was hired years ago but not permitted to acquire seniority like a white employee" because of race
discrimination, likely influenced the Note's Author. SOVERN, supra note 106, at 72. Because of con-
gressional silence, Professor Sovem foresaw that "when new systems are created to replace [systems
based on overt discrimination], Section 703(h) may well induce courts to ignore what went before and
permit continued Negro subordination for years to come." Id. at 73.
184. The Note, supra note 183, at 1272.
-185. Winter, supra note 80, at 841 n.62.
186. The Note, supra note 183, at 1272.
187. Id. at 1262.
188. Id. at 1273.
189. See id. Blumrosen cites the Note with approval. See BLuMRosEN, supra note 159, at 169-211
(asserting that Title VII prohibits the present effects of past discrimination in seniority systems).
190. The Note, supra note 183, at 1273.
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place" solution would only deprive them of seniority expectations of questiona-
ble legitimacy derived from non-bona fide systems.191
Implementing a "rightful place" solution would not be problematic. It
would have very limited impact because a Black worker would still have to meet
existing job qualifications.'" On that note, the Author of the Note described
certain tactics that she or he hoped that courts would recognize as tactics of
discrimination. For example, courts should suspect an employer's post Title
VII introduction of "new and more stringent ability requirements at the same
time they are compelled to open formerly 'white' jobs to incumbent
Negroes."s9 3 Moreover,
[I]f the diploma requirement and other standards not closely related to the abil-
ity to perform a specific job had not previously been imposed on whites entering
the skilled line, and if they exclude[ ] a large number of Negro incumbents,
they would appear, at least prima facie, to operate as a continuation of discrimi-
nation. Such added requirements should be rejected unless the employer can
rebut this presumption by showing that they have some reasonable basis in the
present or future skill requirements of his work force.'
With something bordering on the prescient, Professor Sovern and the
Author of the Note hypothesized the facts and found compelling arguments for
broadening Title VII's purpose. Focus on union seniority systems and the
impact on incumbent Black workers after July 2, 1965 capitalized on the argu-
ments by Title VII critics that such systems should never have been protected
under Section 703(h). Moreover, the present discriminatory impacts of union
seniority systems either fell completely outside of the equality principle or only
slightly within it. In either event, the union seniority system, particularly in the
openly segregated south became the initial target for a successful reconceptual-
ization of discrimination to begin.
C. Discrimination Reconceptualized
As predicted by commentators and scholars, Congress's conceptualization
of discrimination was tested in the courts. This judicial evaluation of the Act
was happening almost simultaneously in different jurisdictions and at different
levels of the federal court system. Conflicting decisions on identical issues were
not rare. Indeed, the coincidence of cases seemed to prevent judges from
being completely aware of contemporary opinions and arguments from other
jurisdictions. In some instances, judges accepted the legislative record and stat-
utory language at face value. The fact that Title VII seemed to do so little was
not grounds for questioning or probing legislative intent. The equality princi-
ple was necessarily restrictive. The 88th Congress's failure to document the
incumbency issue described in the Note did not outweigh the clarity with which
legislators documented the equality principle, the Title's prospective only appli-
cation and the legislative compromise to maintain existing union and manage-
ment liberties, short of the grossest forms of discrimination. Other judges
weighed the force of Title VII's language and legislative history against their
ideas about the Tide's purpose. These judges ultimately used the arguments of
the scholars to reconceptualize discrimination. These judges undermined the
safe harbors the 88th Congress created and declared that Title VII proscribed
191. Id.; see also BLUMROSEN, supra note 159, at 185-87 (stating that whiteness as a benefit, for
instance in circumstances where union membership and therefore employment is based in whole or
part on familial relationships, is not a valid expectation or a benefit that Congress would protect).
192. The Note, supra note 183, at 1275.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1276.
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the present effects of past discrimination. At a minimum, Title VII's prospec-
tive nature, its intent requirement, and its protections for bona fide seniority
systems were not to become impediments to creating remedies that, arguably,
crossed the line drawn by the equality principle and, for a time, undid the 88th
Congress's policy choices to limit Title VII's reach through a narrow conceptu-
alization of discrimination.
As we shall see, during the process of reconceptualizing discrimination
courts used ideas which scholars developed in the specific context of exploring
the boundaries of Section 703(h)'s safe harbors to reach all systems and all
policies relating to the hiring and advancement of Black employees. The
courts, particularly the Eighth Circuit, moved from the proposition that union
membership and seniority systems were corrupted by racism to the proposition
that historical racism likely continued to corrupt all employment decisions after
Title VII became operative. On that basis, reconceptualized discrimination
grew to include the basic assumption that Blacks were innocent victims of his-
torical discrimination resonating in the present and employers and unions were
continuing to discriminate. Because discrimination was so ingrained, its nonex-
istence was a fact employers and unions would have to prove to avoid liability.
1. The Beginning: Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. and Judge Butzner
The legal adoption of reconceptualized discrimination started with Judge
Butzner's opinion in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc."' in 1968. The case was tai-
lor-made for the application of the ideas the scholars generated after passage of
the 1964 Act. It contained the essential ingredients of a formally segregated
unionized workforce: lines of seniority that limited Blacks to the hardest and
lowest paying work and the application of seniority rules after July 2, 1965 that
stripped Blacks of their employment seniority if they transferred to have better
paying "white" jobs."' The facts of the Quarles case so closely mirrored the
hypothetical scenarios argued by the Note's Author, that Judge Butzner of the
Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation on the Quarles trial, openly and freely
adopted the Note's arguments and its "rightful place" solution.' 9 7
Quarks was a class action brought by incumbent Black employees under
Title VII. The plaintiffs raised four issues: (1) Phillip Morris continued discrim-
inatory hiring practices after the Title became effective; (2) the company dis-
criminated against Blacks in the employment and promotion of supervisors; (3)
Phillip Morris paid Blacks less than white employees for the same work; and (4)
Phillip Morris discriminated against incumbent Blacks, those hired beforeJanu-
ary 1, 1966, with respect to transfer, advancement and seniority.' The Quarles
plaintiffs lost on the first three issues."'9 According to Judge Butzner: "The
final issue is whether the restrictive departmental transfer and seniority provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement are intentional, unlawful employ-
ment practices because they are superimposed on a departmental structure that
was organized on a racially segregated basis."2 00 The facts showed that Blacks
hired into Black jobs only retained their employment seniority by progressing
195. See 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
196. Id. at 509-14.
197. See id. at 510 ("A perceptive analysis of the problem and its solution, upon which the court
has freely drawn, may be found in Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80
HAuv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).").
198. See id. at 507.
199. See id. (stating that on the issue of unequal pay Judge Butzner, denying class-wide relief,
awarded relief to two individuals).
200. Id. at 510.
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in or transferring to other Black jobs.20 ' Once Blacks were allowed to bid to
transfer to white jobs, progression in which was governed by departmental
seniority, Black's lost all seniority and seniority protections. 202 Judge Butzner
framed his decision around the following question: "Are present consequences
of past discrimination covered by the act?"203 With heavy reliance on the Note,
he answered that the 1964 Act covered the present effects of historical
discrimination. 204
Judge Butzner was not convinced by the defendants' arguments that Title
VII excluded from coverage the present effects of past discrimination. Despite
the mustering of the extensive legislative history to the contrary,Judge Butzner
concluded that the plain language of the statute did not exclude "present dis-
crimination that originated in seniority systems devised before the date of the
act."205 As a matter of expressing legislative intent,Judge Butzner believed that
Congress needed to specifically state within Title VII that it "condoned the pre-
sent differences that are a result of intention to discriminate before the effec-
tive date of the act[.]" 20 6 To Judge Butzner, the absence of such language, in
the context of the 1964 Act as a whole, meant that "Congress did not inten Ed]
to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns
that existed before the act."207 Tracing the arguments of the Note's Author,
Judge Butzner rejected a reading of legislative history where a protected bona
fide seniority system merely had to exist before July 2, 1965 to escape the Title's
proscription against discrimination. 208 Instead, he held that "a departmental
seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide
seniority system." '"
Judge Butzner also specifically addressed the issue of discriminatory intent
related to the discriminatory effects of departmental seniority. 210 According to
the judge, discriminatory intent traveled to the present with the discriminatory
effect.2 ' It was undisputed that Phillip Morris and the union had discrimi-
201. See id. at 512.
202. See id. at 513 ("On the other hand, organization of the departments on a racially segregated
basis has prevented Negroes from advancing on their merits to jobs open only to white persons.
Employment without regard to race since January 1966 and the relaxation of departmental transfers
has only partially eliminated this disadvantage.").
203. Id. at 510.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 515.
206. Id. at 518.
207. Id. at 516.
208. See id. at 517 ("Obviously one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of
discrimination."). Judge Butzner also noted the simplistic nature of Congress's discussion of seniority
systems. See id. The record reflected a nearly exclusive focus on employment seniority rather than on
departmental seniority which scholars identified as the primary problem for existing workers. See id.
The legislative history on the Section 703(h) seniority system safe harbor was therefore irrelevant to a
discussion of the impact of departmental seniority. "None of the excerpts upon which the company
and the union rely suggests that as a result of past discrimination a Negro is to have employment
opportunities inferior to those of a white person with less employment seniority." Id. at 516.
209. Id. at 517. But cf The Note, supra note 183, at 1272-73 ("A 'bona fide' seniority system
appears to be one which can be explained or justified on nonracial grounds. Some seniority systems
which are in fact designed to discriminate against Negroes may be justifiable on neutral grounds and
would be lawful absent this discriminatory intent However, even though a discriminatory system of this type
might be termed 'bonafide, 'certain 'differences' in treatment authorized ly the system will 'resulit'from the discrimi-
natory intention which entered into its establishment. These differences must, therefore, fall outside the scope of
[Section 703(h)'s] protection." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
210. judge Butzner did nothing with the apparent conflict between his findings that Philip Mor-
ris and the union were not discriminating afterjanuary 1, 1966 which is the basis for his rulings against
the plaintiffs on their claims of discriminatory hiring, promotion, and pay.
211. This idea mirrored Professor Blumrosen's argument that intent was a tort concept based on
knowledge of consequences rather than current evil motive. BLUMROSEN, supra note 159, at 173.
Intent under Title VII "involves awareness that the acts of the defendant would inflict harm on the
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nated extensively in the past.2 12 That discriminatory intent remained in the
present because the differences established by that intent between Black
employment opportunity and white employment opportunity "are maintained
now."213
The judge paid special attention to the equality principle. His discussion
focused on Title VII's prohibitions of preferences and the fact that all outcomes
were ultimately to be tested by the ability to do the job.214 He adopted the
"rightful place" remedy the Note outlined because it avoided scrapping a busi-
ness-justified departmental structure and limited preference to the undeniably
race neutral basis of overall employment seniority.21
5 White workers' expecta-
tions based on departmental seniority were not "vested, indefeasible rights."
2 1 6
They were subject to legal and contractual modification.2 17 Moreover, as every
scholar and Judge Butzner noted, taking away the Section 703(h) safe harbor
only granted the right to show that a Black employee could qualify for and do
the job on her own merit. It did not guarantee that the unqualified would get
or keep any jobs. 2 1 8
2. The Middle: Griggs v. Duke Power Company and Judge Gordon
Judge Butzner issued his Quarles opinion on January 4, 1968. In another
jurisdiction governed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a case similar to
Quarles, Criggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 19 would be decided by Judge Gordon 220 in the
Middle District of North Carolina on September 30, 1968 with the opposite
result. Unlike Quarles, Griggs was not a union seniority system case. That factual
disparity would have consequences for the reconceptualization of discrimina-
tion because unlike Quares, Griggs would be appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court where the discussion of systems beyond those that established
seniority rights by collective bargaining would open the door to a challenge of
the present discriminatory effects of any policy or practice that had its roots in
the era before the 1964 Act. Also, unlike Quarles, Griggs included the problem
of setting job qualifications through testing and educational requirements that
allowed additional reconceptualizing of discrimination on that Section 703(h)
safe harbor the Quarles decision did not reach.
plaintiff. This awareness provides the element of 'blameworthiness' which distinguishes the inten-
tional from the negligent infliction of harm in modern tort law." Id.
212. See Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 517.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 518 (citing Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local No. 2708, 263 F.2d 546
(5th Cir. 1959)). According to judge Butzner, Wiitfield tolerates the effects of historical discrimina-
tion where those effects disable Blacks from taking positions because of lack of ability to do the work.
"The fact that white employees received their skill and training in a discriminatory progression line
denied to the Negroes did not outweigh the fact that the Negroes were unskilled and untrained." Id.
215. See id. at 519.
216. Id. at 520.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 52(0-21 (stating that the process judge Butaner designed to make employment
seniority the test for opportunity to transfer and advance and avoid layoff specifically approved screen-
ing for qualification regardless of seniority).
219. 292 F. Supp. 243, 248 (M.D.N.C. 1968), affd in part, rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.
1970), re'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
220. Because Grggs included both seniority systems and job qualification standards in the con-
text of the present impact of historical discrimination on a group of incumbent Blacks, the reconcep-
tualization of discrimination it reached at the Supreme Court represents a mid-point, not a
conclusion. The reconceptualization of discrimination reached its conclusion in a line of contempora-
neous cases in the Eighth Circuit, which took advantage, like Quarle, of the theoretical frameworks of
scholars that advanced the ideas that came to fruition in the Court's Griggs decision. The Eighth
Circuit applied its theories of discrimination to groups of incumbent Blacks and to individuals of color
who employers refused to promote and new Black applicants who employers rejected.
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In the meantime, despite the differences between Quarles and Griggs, they
contained similar ingredients: job lines at the Dan River power plant where the
claims of discrimination arose were historically segregated, Blacks had the
worst, lowest paying jobs in the labor department, and better quality and better
paying work in other departments only became open to them after Title VII
became law.2 2 ' Akin to Judge Butzner, Judge Gordon specifically found that
although Duke Power Company claimed that there was no policy to segregate
Blacks into menial lower paying jobs and to deny Blacks access to better jobs
with better pay, the company had practiced racial discrimination prior to July 2,
1965 when it was legal to do so. 22 2 The absence of a bargained for seniority
system was filled by Duke Power Company's establishment of employment qual-
ifications that Blacks could not readily meet because of notorious educational
deficiencies, that whites never had to meet at all. This was the kind of non-
compliance Professor Sovern and the Note's Author warned against. This was
the present impact of historical discrimination about which the Griggs plaintiffs
complained. Judge Gordon framed the plaintiffs' case this way:
[T]he plaintiffs reason that in subsequently applying the high school education
requirement on a departmental basis only, the initial discrimination was carried
over and continues to the present. This result, they say, is demonstrated by the
fact that white employees without a high school education are eligible for job
openings in the more lucrative departments while Negro employees with the
same or similar educational qualifications are restricted to job classifications in
the lower paying labor department.
Under plaintiffs' theory, the departmental structure of defendant's work
force is tainted by prior discriminatory practices and therefore cannot serve as a
basis for applying educational or general intelligence standards as prerequisites
to promotion. Plaintiffs contend that the present system continues the past dis-
crimination and violates the Act.2 2 3
Judge Gordon's analysis of the evidence discloses that he perceived the
conflict between the plaintiffs' theories and the employer's traditional preroga-
tives of what was necessary for the success of his or her business. Judge Gordon
noted that there was no contention and no evidence that the departmental
system at the Dan River plant was irrational or unjustified. 2 2 4 Judge Butzner
had reached a similar conclusion in deciding not to interfere with Phillip Mor-
ris' departmental system in Quarles.2 2 5 Judge Gordon's conclusion about the
results of Duke Power's exercise of its business judgment, however, reflected a
different perception of his role in reconceptualizing discrimination. According
to Judge Gordon:
If the relief requested by plaintiffs is granted, the defendant will be denied
the right to improve the general quality of its work force or in the alternative will
be required to abandon its departmental system of classification and freeze every
employee without a high school education in his present job without hope of
advancement. 2 2 6
In focusing on the impact on the defendant and the other employees,
Judge Gordon highlighted two key underpinnings of Title VII. The 88th Con-
gress did not design Title VII to circumvent rational business operations.2 2 7
Nor did Congress intend the equality principle to drive any remedy for Blacks
221. See Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 247.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 248.
225. See id. at 249.
226. Id. at 248.
227. See Vaas, supra note 63.
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that punished White people. 228 His focus was on the conflict between tradi-
tional management prerogatives to set job requirements and the impact of
those job requirements on incumbent employees of all races. Judge Gordon
resolved that conflict in favor of the employer as Congress arguably
intended. 22 9
Judge Gordon concluded his analysis of the plaintiffs' attack on the depart-
mental seniority structure at Dan River by considering the reality of whether
any system that segregated in the past could survive a Title VII challenge based
on the plaintiffs' theories. Logically, all systems that discriminated in the past
would be illegal under Title VII because under all such systems, the prior vic-
tims of discrimination would, as at Dan River, "labor under the inequities result-
ing from the past discriminatory promotional policies of [any employer.]" 2 0
Being aware of the legislative history of Title VII and the specific bargains that
protected seniority systems by making the Title's application prospective only,
Judge Gordon concluded that Congress could not have intended the conse-
quences of the plaintiffs' theories.2 3 '
Judge Gordon specifically disagreed with Judge Butzner on whether Title
VII covered the present consequences of past discrimination.
232 Judge Butzner
held the view that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of
Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act."
2 33
In contrast, according to Judge Gordon:
In providing for prospective application only, Congress faced the cold hard
fact of past discrimination and the resulting inequities. Congress also realized
the practical impossibility of eradicating all the consequences of past discrimina-
tion. The 1964 Act has as its purpose the abolition of the policies of discrimina-
tion which produced the inequities.
It is obvious that where discrimination existed in the past, the effects of it
will be carried over into the present.
2 3 4
Judge Gordon's position does not seem irrational. He simply did not share
Judge Butzner's doubts. Judge Butzner reached his conclusion by doubting the
88th Congress' intention to protect existing seniority systems by labeling them
all bona fide so long as they stopped discrimination on and after July 2, 1965.
And like the writer of the Note that shaped his ideas,Judge Butzner overlaid his
personal perspective of what Title VII's purpose should have been on the spe-
cific Congressional mandate, reading "prospective only" out of the legislative
history and out of the law. Judge Gordon accepted the legislative history and
the reality of the political context which birthed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The 88th Congress mandated forward-looking equality of opportunity, not an
equitable result. Congress repeatedly rejected the equitable result idea because
it undermined the equality principle. As Judge Gordon pointed out, the 88th
Congress could not have intended a remedy where whites would be made to
suffer harm (in this case "freezing" out ofjob advancement because of lack of
education) because Blacks suffered the identical harm in the past. Moreover,
there was no evidence that Congress intended to change the level of the playing
field for White workers who took jobs and gained seniority in reliance on the
deal that existed before the nation declared employment discrimination illegal.
228. See id.
229. See Grigs, 292 F. Supp. at 249.
230. Id. at 248.
231. See id. at 249.
232. See id. ("If the decision in Quarles may be interpreted to hold that present consequences of
past discrimination are covered by the Act, this Court holds otherwise.").
233. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. at 516.
234. Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 248.
250
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The lack of congressional debate on this question should not have been read as
a signal to courts to fill the apparent policy void. Legislative intent clearly
directed that Title VII did not provide for any preferential treatment for Blacks.
And that is exactly what moving Blacks into their rightful place would look like
to displaced White workers. If, as in many instances, the simplest explanation is
the correct one, Judge Gordon correctly described congressional intent: after
July 2, 1965 a generation of Black workers would continue to suffer the present
impact of past discrimination in exchange for benefits that might accrue to
succeeding generations of Black workers. There was no need for debate in
Congress of such an obvious premise: that Title VII could not have become law
unless it tolerated significant continuing effects of historical discrimination.
On the issue ofjob testing, an employer's ability to use job tests became a
major hurdle for Title VII proponents in Congress. 2 3 5 "Job testing" became a
totem for whether employers would continue to have their traditional auton-
omy to run their businesses.2 3 6 According to judge Gordon, Title VII "does not
deny an employer the right to determine the qualities, skills, and abilities
required of his employees." 23 7 Judge Gordon's expansive view of the validity of
testing requirements fits well with a view of Title VII as an expression of con-
gressional intent to maintain existing management prerogatives as broadly as
possible. Thus, if a test was professionally developed, as it was in Griggs, its use
could not be challenged based on whether the test always and only measured
the ability to perform specific work. 2 38 The only restriction on the use of tests
in Title VII is the requirement that tests be professionally developed and
neither designed nor used for intentional race discrimination. 23 9 Here, Judge
Gordon's beliefs about the very limited impact the 88th Congress intended
Title VII to have on an employer's ability to design job requirements drove his
conclusion that the professionally developed general intelligence test Duke
Power Company used was immune from attack under Title VII.240 Judge
Gordon believed Duke Power Company's evidence that it had a business pur-
pose for knowing whether job applicants "[had] the general intelligence and
overall mechanical comprehension of the average high school graduate."2 1
Since the test being used was professionally developed and related to that busi-
ness purpose Judge Gordon found for the defendant.
The Fourth Circuit, relying on Quarles and a small handful of other cases
from southern jurisdictions,2 4 2 unanimously disapproved of Judge Gordon's
decision on the use of Title VII to remedy past harms. Acknowledging that "the
Act was intended to have prospective application only," the Fourth Circuit
declared that "relief may be granted to remedy present and continuing effects
of past discrimination."2 43 The Fourth Circuit spent no time analyzing the issue
and therefore did nothing to resolve the concerns Judge Gordon raised about
Title VII's vastly expanded reach into every covered employer who practiced
235. See id. at 249-50.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 250.
238. See id. ("Nowhere does the Act require that employers may utilize only those tests which
accurately measure the ability and skills required of a particularjob or group ofjobs."). On the other
hand, Professor Sovern urged courts to be circumspect of tests which did not limit themselves to the
worker's ability to do the work.
239. See id.
240. Id. ("A test which measures the level of general intelligence, but is unrelated to the job to
be performed is just as reasonably a prerequisite to hiring or promotion as is a high school diploma.
In fact, a general intelligence test is probably more accurate and uniform in application than is the
high school education requirement.").
241. Id.
242. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1970).
243. Id.
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racial discrimination in employment prior to July 2, 1965. At the Dan River
Steam Station, six Black employees met the criteria for relief from the present
effects of past discrimination. 2 " Given the small number of current Black
employees at the Dan River Steam Station, six, to whom the Fourth Circuit
granted relief, there may have been no need to look at the bigger picture. The
Fourth Circuit only required Duke Power to waive its educational and testing
requirements as to those six and to give them "nondiscriminatory consideration
for advancement to other departments if and when job openings occur."
2 4 5
The Fourth Circuit then interrupted the normal functioning of the departmen-
tal seniority system in a very limited way by requiring that these six plaintiffs
have their employment seniority determine their priority for future
advancement. 2 4 6
As to the issue of job relatedness for testing, the Fourth Circuit ruled for
Duke Power Company. 24 7 The Fourth Circuit held the same perspective as
Judge Gordon had on the company's legitimate business reasons for the educa-
tional and testing requirements. The Fourth Circuit couched the issue as
"whether Duke had a valid business purpose in adopting such requirements or
whether the company merely used the requirements to discriminate."
24 8 The
Fourth Circuit relied on admissions in the appellant brief that they were not
challenging an employer's right to set the qualifications for jobs by using
tests.2" 9 The appellants, however, defined "business necessity" to limit employ-
ers to tests that measures a worker's ability to do a specific job.2 5 0 Reviewing
the legislative history, the Fourth Circuit rejected the appellants' restricted view
of "business necessity."
At no place in the Act or in its legislative history does there appear a
requirement that employers may utilize only those tests which measure the abil-
ity and skill required by a specific job or group of jobs. In fact, the legislative
history would seem to indicate clearly that Congress was actually trying to guard
against such a result. An amendment requiring a "direct relation" between the
test and a "particular position" was proposed in May 1968, but was defeated.
2 5 1
One member of the panel rejected this argument. Relying on the same set
of cases that supported Title VII's application to the present and continuing
effects of past discrimination, Judge Sobeloff penned his dissent on the job
relatedness requirement.2 5 2 Judge Sobeloffs dissent is notable for many rea-
sons, but it is most notable for its rejection of Duke Power Company's good
faith. 5 s For Judge Sobeloff, a history of discriminatory hiring practices at Dan
River meant that the court should not accept Duke Power Company's declara-
tions that: first it knew what its business required and, second that a high school
degree or equivalent general intelligence as demonstrated by passing a general
intelligence test met its business needs. If its business required a high school
education, the White employees at Dan River should not have been
grandfathered out of the educational and testing requirement. Grandfathering
244. See id. ("Those six Negro employee-plaintiffs without a high school education or its
equivalent who were discriminatorily hired only into the Labor Department prior to Duke's institution
of the educational requirement in 1955 were simply locked into the Labor Department by the adop-
tion of this requirement.").
245. Id. at 1231.
246. See id. at 1236.
247. See id. at 1235.
248. Id. at 1232.
249. See id.
250. Id. at 1234.
251. Id. at 1235 (footnote omitted).
252. See id. at 1239 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
253. See id. at 1245-46.
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delegitimized Duke Power's business justification and strongly called up the
specter of race discrimination. In Judge Sobeloffs view:
[I]t cannot be ignored that while this practice does not constitute forthright
racial discrimination, the policy disfavoring the outside employees has primary
impact on blacks. This effect is possible only because a history of overt bias
caused the departments to become so imbalanced in the first place. The result
is that in 1969, four years after the passage of Title VII, Dan River looks substan-
tially like it did before 1965. The Labor Department is all black; the rest is virtu-
ally lily-white.2 54
Judge Butzner and Judge Sobeloffs views ultimately prevailed at the
Supreme Court. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, declared
that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."2 5 5 The Court
adopted the narrow definition of "business necessity," at least as applied to the
use of tests. In future, Title VII would require tests to be related to the specific
employment and the employer would have "the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion."2 56 Moreover, the employer's intent was irrelevant.2 5 7
3. The Conclusion: Discrimination Reconceptualized and the Eighth Circuit
1969-1972
Ater the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and before its decision in
Green v. McDonnell Douglas, the Eighth Circuit was reconceptualizing discrimina-
tion in ways that went well beyond the specific confines of Title VII before the
Court decided Griggs in 1971. Eighth Circuit jurisprudence foreshadowed
Griggs' expansion of the definition of employment discrimination to cover the
present effects of historical harms. Beginning in 1969 the Eighth Circuit began
affirming that Title VII could and should correct the continuing harm of histor-
ical discrimination in the present. This, of course, is the logical foundation for
the Court's conclusion in Griggs. In developing its view of employment discrim-
ination, however, the Eighth Circuit went beyond creating a pre-Griggs disparate
impact framework for analyzing employment discrimination claims. The
Eighth Circuit also defined an original version of "the basic assumption" for all
types of employment discrimination claims.
In two pre-Griggs decisions, United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local Union No. 36158 and Parham v. Southwest Bell Telephone Co.,"6' the Eighth
Circuit rejected the idea that Title VII was limited to harms arising only after
the statute's operative date. These cases also contain the building blocks of the
original "basic assumption" about proving employment discrimination after
Title VII's effective date: an assumption of discrimination and an assumption of
harm.
254. Id. at 1247.
255. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
256. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
257. See id.
258. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
259. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
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a. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36:
September 1969-Assumption of Discrimination and Assumption of
Harm Part I
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, a pattern and practice case
brought by the Attorney General, litigated the question of discrimination in the
context of historically segregated unions. Sheet Metal Workers dealt with the
problem of all white union membership in the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan
area.
2 0 The unions in question, Local No. 36 and Local No. 1, were exclusively
white prior to 1966. These locals also controlled access to almost all the sheet
metal and electrical work in the St. Louis Metropolitan area. As specifically
authorized by the 88th Congress, the Department ofJustice filed a pattern and
practice discrimination case complaining that "nepotism is a policy and practice
of both unions, that the unions have failed to inform Negroes of the opportuni-
ties to become members of the unions, and they have failed to organize employ-
ers who employ Negroes. "261
The case was tried beforeJudge Meredith, the same judge who would pre-
side over the trial of Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. Identical to Judge
Gordon, the Griggs trial judge, Judge Meredith started from the proposition
that there could be no liability under Title VII for conduct occurring before its
effective date, July 2, 1965, or after the date the government filed suit, February
4, 1966.262 According to Judge Meredith's summary of the evidence, the gov-
ernment failed entirely to demonstrate that nepotism limited union member-
ship to whites, 2 63 or that there were any other significant race related failures,
including the use of union seniority for access to employment through referrals
or hiring halls, by the locals afterJuly 2, 1965. Judge Meredith's analysis showed
that Black membership in the locals was not the result of a pattern and practice
of discrimination, but of an unwillingness of Blacks to take advantage of the
equal opportunity to join the locals after July 1965. The facts showed that the
locals accepted and placed those Blacks who applied for membership and
showed up to take the given tests. 26
4 Moreover, no one filed a complaint or
charge of discrimination against either of the locals with any federal, state, or
local body charged with responsibility for enforcing laws prohibiting racial
discrimination.2
6 5
According to Judge Meredith the government' case also failed to show a
Title VII violation based on a discriminatory denial of union seniority and
related benefits. As to Local 36 there was no evidence that any Black person
signed up for work prior to January 1, 1968.266 As to Local 1, the electrical
union, Judge Meredith described the groups and their composition.
2 6 7 Mem-
bership in Group I, for example, garnered the most preferential treatment
because its membership was restricted by experience and seniority in the
union.268 All preferential treatment, regardless of group number, depended
on membership in the union.2 6'" Without union membership, there was no
260. The St. Louis Arch project, February 12, 1963-October 28, 1965, employed significant
numbers of union sheet metal workers. Percy Green protested the fact that the Arch project employed
almost no Blacks by climbing the Arch as an act of civil disobedience on July 14, 1964.
261. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 36, 280 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Mo.
1968).
262. See id. at 720-21.
263. See id. at 722-23.
264. See id. at 723, 726.
265. See id. at 723.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 726-27.
268. See id. at 727.
269. See id.
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accumulation of union seniority. Moreover, the union by collective bargaining
became the "sole and exclusive source of referrals of applicants for employ-
ment[ ]" of electricians in the St. Louis metropolitan area. 270 The evidence,
according to Judge Meredith, showed no discrimination. 271
In response to the government's argument that "in view of the past prac-
tices of these unions, [the seniority based] distinctions effectively discriminate
against Negroes," 27 2 Judge Meredith explored the legislative history of Title VII
regarding union seniority. He concluded, as wouldJudge Gordon in Griggs,273
that Title VII was entirely prospective. The only evidence of discrimination that
Judge Meredith saw was that before the effective date of Title VII both locals
excluded Blacks from membership. 274 In summary:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not intended to penalize unions or others
for their sins prior to the effective date of the Act. It is prospective only.
Neither was it passed to destroy seniority rights in unions or in business. The
Act specifically forbids a union or a business from giving preferential treatment
to Negroes to correct an existing imbalance of whites.275
There being no evidence of discrimination after July 2, 1965, Judge Meredith
found no Title VII violation.2 7 6
It is noteworthy thatJudge Gordon and Judge Meredith reached identical
conclusions independent of each other. Judge Meredith's Sheet Metal Workers
decision came down on March 7, 1968.277 Judge Gordon decided Griggs almost
eight months later on September 30, 1968.278 Judge Gordon made no refer-
ence to the supportive Sheet Metal Workers opinion.2 7 1 Nor did he discuss Judge
Heebe's March 26, 1968 opinion in United States by Clark v. United Papermakers &
Papeworkers which adopted Judge Butzner's reasoning from Quarles.2"o By the
time Judge Gordon decided Griggs, federal district court judges were evenly
split on the question whether Title VII covered the present and continuing
effects of past discrimination. One of the takeaways from this split is that it was
reasonable to conclude restricting Title VII to a prospective application only,
where a generation of incumbent Black workers would suffer the continuing
effects of historical discrimination was exactly what the 88th Congress contem-
plated and intended. The Eighth Circuit's Sheet Metal Workers decision, how-
ever, adopted the Quarles principles four months before the Fourth Circuit
decided the Griggs plaintiffs' appeal from Judge Gordon's decision.
The Eighth Circuit's approach in Sheet Metal Workers derived from the gov-
ernment's change in tactics. Before Judge Meredith, the government based its
case on nepotism that continued afterJuly 2, 1965 at both Locals. 2 8 ' There was
little evidence to support the government's claim that nepotism was camouflag-
ing continued intentional exclusion of Blacks from union membership. 28 2
Before the Eighth Circuit, the government argued that it did not have to prove
270. See id. at 726 (citation omitted).
271. See id. at 727.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 728.
274. See id. at 730.
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 719.
278. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
279. See id.
280. See United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.
La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
281. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 280 F. Supp. 719,
721 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
282. See id. at 722-23.
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injury to any Blacks to establish a pattern and practice case.2" FollowingJudge
Butzner's reasoning in Quarles, the government also argued that Title VII
required race neutral employment practices and "an obligation to correct or
revise practices which would perpetuate racial discrimination. "284 The Eighth
Circuit held that it was "[unnecessary] for the government to prove that the
Locals have refused membership or work referral to Negroes since the effective
date of the Act."285 The Eighth Circuit then gave a detailed history of the
Locals' discrimination and the continued absence of any Blacks in the Locals.
This history focused on how historical discrimination limited Blacks from join-
ing the Locals and continued to limit Black employment opportunities because
racism artificially delayed their union membership.
2 86 The Eighth Circuit
determined that the employment referral systems approved by Judge Meredith
were discriminatory "[b]ecause the plans carry forward the effects of former
discriminatory practices." 287 Given the unique facts of Sheet Metal Workers, the
Eighth Circuit found specific legislative history to support holding the Locals
liable under Title VII. According to the Clark and Case Memorandum,
although there was no intent to reach incumbent White seniority generally,
even where that "incumbent work force was restricted to whites" and "where
waiting lists for employment or training are prior to the effective date of the
Title, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after the Title
takes effect may be held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish discrimina-
tion."2 88  With this reference and references to Quarles and the Note, the
Eighth Circuit modified the access to and qualification requirements for both
Local's referral systems to eliminate those requirements that Blacks could not
meet which kept them out of the highest group with the greatest likelihood of
gaining referred employment.28 9 The Eighth Circuit then explained that the
modifications were not quotas or preferential treatment, "[njor do we deprive
any non-Negro craftsman of bona fide seniority rights."
29 0 The unique facts of
Sheet Metal Workers, a case where employers were not defendants, allowed the
Eighth Circuit to expand the numbers in the preferred groups without explic-
itly displacing anyone's priority to the next job.291
In holding that Title VII covered the present and continuing effects of
historical discrimination, the Eighth Circuit relied on the core group of cases,
including Quarks, that expanded the definition of actionable discriminatory
conduct. The Eighth Circuit's Sheet Metal Workers decision, however, went well
beyond all supportive precedent by not requiring the existence of a plaintiff
that suffered injury in the present.2 9 2 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged this




286. See id. at 127-31.
287. Id. at 131.
288. Id. at 134 n.20 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 6992 (1964)).
289. See id. at 133.
290. Id. (footnote omitted).
291. The absence of the employers, however, and the appearance of merely making the pie
larger are misleading. For example, fair or unfair, a sudden increase in the size of Group 1, the group
with the highest likelihood of referred employment, means a decrease in the chances that opportuni-
ties will open for members of Group 2 with ever decreasing opportunities for members of the bottom
two tiers in the system. Moreover, the relevant employers were present in the sense that the Eighth
Circuit recognized that collective bargaining agreements between the Locals and any employers would
need modification if the Locals maintained the referral systems as modified by the court. See id. at 132
n.16.
292. See id. at 132 n.15.
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distinction and lack of evidence that someone had been harmed.29 3 The
Eighth Circuit did not believe that such evidence was necessary.2 9 4
The Eighth Circuit relied on reality rather than legal precedent to explain
why there was no injured plaintiff and why the absence of that key ingredient
should not prevent Title VII from doing its work. Reality, according to the
Eighth Circuit, showed that the Locals were so notoriously racist that it was
unreasonable to expect Black workers to subject themselves to the racism and
then wait a year for the potential of gaining enough seniority to have a chance
at full employment.' Here is where the Eighth Circuit invents a concept that
would become known as "the basic assumption" underpinning how employ-
ment discrimination occurred in an environment where signs advertising jobs
"for Whites only" could no longer be seen. Logically, if everyone agrees that
there has been racism, that the objects of racial hatred and exclusion are aware
of their profound undesirability and the haters agree that they intentionally
excluded Blacks in the past for racial reasons only, then we can assume that the
hatred of and desire to exclude Blacks did not suddenly disappear on July 2,
1965 and we can assume that Blacks did not wake up wide-eyed under a cab-
bage leaf as the sun rose that day either. The basic assumption, then, has two
parts. Intentional racial discrimination continued afterJuly 2, 1965. 26 Blacks
continued to be victims of that discrimination regardless of whether they took
the formal step of being re-victimized to accrue a visible injury after July 2,
1965.
There is little recognition of the explosive nature of the Eighth Circuit's
conception of "the basic assumption" as a two-part process of presumed inten-
tional discrimination and presumed injury. For example, in his Fourth Circuit
Griggs dissent which came down four months after Sheet Metal Workers, Judge
Sobeloff wrote about the first part of "the basic assumption":
The pattern of racial discrimination in employment parallels that which we
have witnessed in other areas. Overt bias, when prohibited, has ofttimes been
supplanted by more cunning devices designed to impart the appearance of neu-
trality, but to operate with the same invidious effect as before.2 9 7
Judge Sobeloff, however, does not write anything about the existence or
impact of the presumed injury part of "the basic assumption." Once can
explain this omission with the fact that the Fourth Circuit did not have to
assume an injured plaintiff to review the merits of the case because Grggs
included plaintiffs with claims of injuries sustained after July 2, 1965.
The Eighth Circuit also addressed the admissions requirements the Locals
imposed and unlike Judge Meredith, found some of them in violation of Title
VII. On the specific issue of testing necessary for admission to Local 36 as a
journeyman sheet metal worker, Local 36 violated Title VII by using an unduly
subjective testing procedure. One man administers the test which has no time
limits and no established passing score. The examiner does not forward the
test sheets or scores with his decision on qualification. The examiner simply
tells the union that an applicant is, or is not, qualified." The Eighth Circuit
held that because the standard-less testing procedures left no way to measure
293. See id. at 132.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. The Eighth Circuit approved judge Meredith's finding of discrimination by the Locals
before 1964 but went on to infer that the exclusionary policies continued afterJuly 2, 1965 based on a
comparison of membership in the Locals (entirely White) and the diversity of the available pool of
workers. See id. at 127, 127 n.7.
297. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970).
298. See Steel Workers, 416 F.2d at 135.
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the judgement of the examiner for discriminatory intent, "it is essential that
journeymen's examinations be objective in nature, that they be designed to test
the ability of the applicant to do that work usually required of a journeyman
and that they be given and graded in such a manner as to permit review."299
Judge Sobeloff quotes this language from Sheet Metal Workers in his Griggs dis-
sent.30o As mentioned earlier, this language becomes the centerpiece of the
Supreme Court's creation of the job-relatedness requirement.
3 0 1
Moreover, this is the starting point for the Eighth Circuit's development of
a jurisprudence of doubt not only about the impact of testing procedures but
also about the motivation and intention behind the use of all procedures that
adversely impacted Black employment. The exploration of employer motiva-
tions continued in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
b. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.: October 1970-The
Assumption of Discriminatory Intent and the Assumption of Harm Part
H1
The Eighth Circuit followed Sheet Metal Workers with a second pre-Griggs
decision in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.s
0 2 Parham differed from
Sheet Metal Workers in some respects. It included an allegedly injured plaintiff,
Mr. Parham, and it was brought as a straight forward case of disparate treat-
ment. Mr. Parham also brought the case as a class action on behalf of all cur-
rent and prospective Black employees of Southwestern Bell.
0
s The Eighth
Circuit took advantage of the class action posture of the case to review the
phone company's conduct through the Sheet Metal Worker's pattern and practice
lens.
Mr. Parham's disparate treatment class action shared three essential ele-
ments with Sheet Metal Workers. First, the case arose in the south, Little Rock,
Arkansas. Second, the employer had a long history of racial discrimination.
Prior to 1964, the phone company did not employ blacks in any skilled job.so
4
As of September 1964, the phone company employed 2,736 people.
3 0 5 Of
these, there were fifty-one Black employees largely of long tenure.
0 6 Of these,
forty-six were janitors or laborers.30 7 The remaining five Black employees were
coin collectors or stockmen.sos The hiring system, based on word of mouth
referrals, afterJuly 2, 1965 would maintain segregated employment and limited
job opportunity for Blacks.3 0 ' Third, the Black people were innocent.
The district court overlooked these indicia culpability. Rather, the district
court took the "prospective only" view of Title VII.sio In this case, the phone
company had taken a proactive stance by issuing a statement of non-discimina-
tion as early as April 1964.11 Moreover, the phone company's statistical evi-
299. Id. at 136. The Eighth Circuit highlighted that "[w]e are concerned rather with the system,
the nature of the examination, its objectivity and its susceptibility to review." Id.
300. See Gris, 420 F.2d at 1241.
301. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("any given requirement must have
a manifest relationship to the employment in question").
302. See 433 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
303. See id. at 422.





309. See id. at 427 n.5.
310. This is the perspective judge Gordon took in the Griggs trial and Judge Meredith took in
the Sheet Metal Workers trial.
311. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 424.
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dence showed that things were changing. By June 1968, Southwestern Bell
employed 144 Black workers and Black workers had begun to penetrate the
skilled jobs with only thirty-six remaining as janitors, laborers, coin collectors or
stockmen. 312 From the trial judge's perspective, Southwestern Bell, absolved of
its pre-Title VII racism, had acted in good faith and was making good pro-
gress.31' The trial judge found these facts persuasive even though the judge
found that the phone company continued its historical practice of filling vacan-
cies by word of mouth and even though that method would maintain racial
segregation." 4 As to Mr. Parham's individual claim, his reference checks
showed that he had a problem retaining employment and that problems show-
ing up on time and consistently."'1 The trial court acknowledged that the very
small number of Black employees at Southwestern Bell pre-1966 was "probably
discriminatory" but found for the telephone company on all counts.3 1 6
Through its prospective only application of Title VII, Parham mirrored the dis-
trict court opinions in Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers. Moreover, the Parham
district court accepted the employer's post July 2, 1965 actions at face value,
never questioning the disparity between those actions and evidence of contin-
ued discriminatory motivation.
The Eighth Circuit held as a matter of law that the statistical evidence
alone established a Title VII violation.3 1 7 Further, the trial court erred "in com-
pletely absolving the Company of unlawful employment practices" based on-its
efforts after Mr. Parham filed his case.3"' The Company's belated efforts "can-
not alter the fact that racial discrimination against blacks [as a class] existed
well after July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII."s" 9
The Eighth Circuit also held in favor of the class on Southwestern Bell's
recruitment policy. The word of mouth referral system had not changed
between July 2, 1965 and the phone company's rejection of Mr. Parham's appli-
cation in February 1967.320 Without using the words "freeze in place," the
Eighth Circuit held that word of mouth employment referral discriminated
against Blacks: "With an almost completely white work force, it is hardly surpris-
ing that such a system of recruitment produced few, if any, black applicants. As
might be expected, existing white employees tended to recommend their own
312. See id. at 425.
313. Southwestern Bell had initiated what it called "affirmative action" programs in 1967 and
1968 enrolling Black high school graduates in a special training program to help them compete suc-
cessfully for the more skilled jobs. There were ten trainees in 1967. The phone company offered jobs
to five. One accepted. In 1968, the program serviced eleven trainees. The phone company offered
jobs to eight and four accepted. See id. at 425. This kind of headway against historical discrimination
looks like the kind of headway the union locals were making in Sheet Metal Workers. Tojudge Meredith,
the minimal progress was enough. It was not the previous racism of the Locals that caused the Black
membership numbers to be so low. It was the Black people who failed to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Eighth Circuit specifically commented that the "failure" of Blacks to
join racist Locals was not an unwillingness to take advantage of opportunity but a recognition of the
notorious reputations of the Locals as bodies of racial iniquity. Although the low numbers of Black
trainees who accepted offers of apparently skilled jobs with good pay may reflect a similar belief about
Southwestern Bell, the Eighth Circuit did not comment on the issue.
314. See id. at 427 n.5.
315. See id. at 423. Mr. Parham also introduced testimony from other Black applicants South-
western Bell did not hire. The phone company responded with "evidence tending to show valid busi-
ness reason supporting its refusal to hire each of them." Id. at 425.
316. Id. at 425 ("[A] preponderance of the evidence does not sustain plaintiffs claim that defen-
dant is now discriminating against Negroes as a class or that he (Parham) personally was a victim of
any racial discrimination.").
317. See id. at 426. In a footnote, the Eighth Circuit noted that the trial judge took judicial
notice of census data showing that 21.9% of Arkansas' population was Black. See id. at 426 n.4.
318. See id.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 426-27.
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relatives, friends and neighbors, who would likely be of the same race."
3 21 In a
footnote, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that the trial judge came to the correct
conclusion on the issue in that "employment in the 'all white' categories, would
be continue to be all white, and employment in the predominantly lower Negro
categories would continue to be predominately Negro."
2 2
As to Parham's disparate treatment claim, the Eighth Circuit confirmed
the district court's judgement against him as not clearly erroneous. 3 2 3 Never-
theless, the Eighth Circuit marshalled the facts, including Southwestern Bell's
history of discrimination, to highlight the underlying issue with Parham's rejec-
tion as an individual. As the record stood, the Eighth Circuit agreed that it was
not clear error for the judge to accept the company's explanation that it did not
hire Parham because of a poor reference.*2 On the other hand, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the EEOC's cause finding on Parham's individual case ques-
tioned the "objectivity" for the poor reference as possibly racially biased.3
25
The circuit court then described a Parham that did not match the poor refer-
ence. When Southwestern Bell rejected him, Parham went on a religious mis-
sion to the Arctic Circle and began successfully studying for the ministry.
3 2 6
The Eighth Circuit concluded that he was "a young man possessed of considera-
ble intellectual capability and sincerity."
3 2 7 The Eighth Circuit's effort to reveal
a Parham that conflicted with the record it affirmed suggests that the Eight
Circuit too questioned the objectivity of Parham's reference. The Eighth Cir-
cuit also focused heavily on the fact that the company's compliance efforts
began only after Parham filed his case. The court's focus on Parham's charac-
ter and the company's post facto compliance evidence the Eighth Circuit's grow-
ing jurisprudence of doubt. That jurisprudence would continue to develop
after the Supreme Court issued its Griggs opinion.
c. Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office: March 1971-Foreshadowing Green
v. McDonnell Douglas
Marquez's Title VII case was the Eighth Circuit's first case after the
Supreme Court Griggs decision. 3 2
8 At the district court, despite Quarles, Sheet
Metal Workers, Parham, and the Fourth Circuit's Griggs decision, Judge Robinson
did not adopt the logic or reasoning supporting the jurisprudence favoring
remedying the present effects of past discrimination. 329 He acknowledged the
existence of the jurisprudence that Title VII could remedy the present effects of
historical discrimination, but he questioned the general application of the doc-
trine. With specific reference to Quarles, Judge Robinson wrote: "As with senior-
ity rights, the question here, and with any case involving the effects of past
discrimination on present actions, is whether the past discrimination should be
considered."330
Marquez, an American of Mexican descent, claimed that Ford discrimi-
nated against him because of his national origin when Ford failed to promote
321. Id. at 427.
322. Id. at 427 n.5.
323. See id. at 428.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 428 n.6.
326. See id.
327. Id.
328. See Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 313 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Neb. 1970), revd, 440 F.2d
1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
329. See id. at 1406.
330. Id. (emphasis added).
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him.3 3' Ford asserted that its business required personnel in grade six posi-
tions, like Marquez, to have experience as grade seven field representatives to
qualify for promotion to grade nine.3 3 2 Judge Robinson accepted Ford's busi-
ness justification for refusing to promote Marquez and doubted the existence
of any unlawful reason for Ford's decision.3 3 3 Marquez simply did not have the
qualifications. 33 For that reason, there was no discrimination against
Marquez. 3 3 5
Tellingly, Judge Robinson dismissed as irrelevant Marquez' evidence that
there were no minorities other than him at his place of work in Ford's Omaha,
Nebraska office. Absence of Blacks, Jews, and Mexicans was insufficient to
bring Marquez within the line of cases like Steel Workers and Parham because
those cases were based on the presence of minorities in segregated employ-
ment.3 3 6 Judge Robinson also had evidence that Marquez had been in his
grade six position for fifteen years.3 3 7 Moreover Judge Robinson found that
Ford offered Marquez the grade seven job after Marquez complained of dis-
crimination to the EEOC.3 38 The judge did not view this evidence as a sign that
Ford had a past or present discriminatory motive. It did not cause him to ques-
tion why Ford suddenly became willing to give Marquez the opportunity to
obtain the required job qualification for the grade nine position. To Judge
Robinson, the only significance of the post litigation job offer was that Marquez
was not "frozen" in place like the plaintiffs in Quarles.3 1
The Eighth Circuit held that Judge Robinson got everything wrong.3 40
Relying on the Supreme Court's recent Griggs opinion, the circuit court
bypassed scrutinizing Ford's business judgment about the necessary qualifica-
tions for promotion into a grade nine job."4 ' It was a facially neutral policy that
perpetuated and rejuvenated past discrimination.34 ' To the Eighth Circuit the
lily-white fifty-five member staff of the Omaha office constituted evidence of
past discrimination. Moreover, between 1950 and 1967, the period of Marquez
employment before he filed suit, in a region reaching from St. Louis to Denver
Ford only had two Black employees.3 4 3 In apparent response to Marquez suit,
Ford hired two Black employees in Omaha and offered Marquez the job he
needed to qualify for the job that he wanted." Judge Robinson was wrong to
have dismissed these facts in analyzing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.3 4 5
The Eighth Circuit also determined that Marquez had been "frozen" into
his grade six job for fifteen years.3 4 6 Unlike Judge Robinson, the Eighth Circuit
331. See id. at 1405.
332. See id. at 1406.
333. See id. at 1405.
334. See id. at 1406.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 1407.
337. This fact does not appear in the district court opinion. It appears in the Eighth Circuit's
opinion. See Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971). There is no
reason to believe thatJudge Robinson was not aware of this fact as he discussed Marquez' employment
record noting that "there is also no evidence to indicate that the employment record of plaintiff is
substantially different from other employees." Marquez, 313 F. Supp. at 1407.
338. See id. at 1406.
339. See id.
340. See Marquez, 440 F.2d at 1159.
341. See id. at 1160-61.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 1160 n.6.
345. See id. at 1160.
346. See id.
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implicitly asked the question: Why didn't Marquez ever get the chance to
achieve the necessary qualification for the grade nine job? Ford could not
answer that question. Marquez had not been promoted since 1956."' Before
he filed his complaint all his performance appraisals had been exemplary.
3 4 8
He was rated promotable in 1961.349 In April 1963, without explanation in the
trial record or his personnel file, Ford took Marquez off the promotable list.
3
so
Moreover, undisputed evidence showed that Marquez was Ford's only eligible
employee denied training in comparison to similarly situated employees."'
The Eighth Circuit did not specifically condemn Ford as racist. It doubted that
Ford was free of racism: "If [Marquez's] nonpromotional 'frozen' status was
caused in part by racial discrimination, the company's policy in refusing to con-
sider him for any promotion is inherently invalid and discriminatory to him."
3 5 2
The evidence showed the Eighth Circuit that its doubts were correct about Ford
because Ford offered "no rational reason" to dispel the doubts.
5 3
It would take exactly one year from Marquez for the Eighth Circuit to
decide the McDonnell Douglas case. Marquez previewed the outcome of McDon-
nell Douglas in demonstrating the Eighth Circuit's reconceptualization of dis-
crimination. Its vision of the discrimination Title VII was meant to remedy
involved a realistic assessment of the power of the past. In its experience,
decades of engaging in discrimination without consequence did not end on
July 2, 1965. Compliance with Title VII was not voluntary. Significant purveyors
of employment like the Steel Workers Union, Southwestern Bell, and Ford had
engaged in deliberate discrimination in the past. They claimed innocence in
the exercise of their business judgment, but their inability or unwillingness to
stop discriminating in the present was reflected in the actions they took after a
person of color sued them. Discrimination was ubiquitous. As Professor Sovern
had proposed and the Supreme Court in Griggs seemed to require, all employ-
ment decisions were subject to the jurisprudence of doubt-a doubt that could
only be dispelled by affirmative proof that any adverse employment decision
was untainted by a history of discrimination. Only objective proof of job-relat-
edness would suffice.
d. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.: March 1972"'4
Judge Meredith, the trial court judge in the Steel Workers case, decided the
Green case against civil rights activist Percy Green in September 1970. -5
Among other facts, Judge Meredith described Percy Green as an average
employee basing his claim of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas's failure to
rehire him due to his civil rights activism. 35 6 Green started working for the
company in 1956 and was ultimately laid-off with eight others in August
347. See id. at 1162.





353. See id. at 1162. Although the Eighth Circuit advanced its jurisprudence of doubt in the
Marquez case, it followed the equality principle in denying Marquez instant promotion to a grade nine
position. This would have been a grant of special privilege because of the undisputed facts that Mar-
quez did not have the prerequisite experience in grade seven or eight. See id. Thus, the remand to the
district court to fashion relief to allow Marquez to take a grade seven or eightjob. See id. at 1162-63.
354. See 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
355. See Green v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
356. See id. at 847.
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1964.' He had already made his famous climb of the St. Louis Arch to protest
the lack of Black workers on this federally funded project.3 5 8 After layoffs in his
department became imminent McDonnell Douglas offered Green and his col-
leagues the opportunity to take a voluntary test to help find whether he and
others could fill positions with higher job classifications. Green refused the
test. According toJudge Meredith, Green "expressed the idea that because he
was black and because of his prominence in civil rights activities, he should
receive preferential treatment in the layoff.""' After the layoff, to protest
McDonnell Douglas's employment record with Blacks generally and Green spe-
cifically, Green engaged in and approved of two self-help protests.3 6 0 He organ-
ized and participated in a "stall in" in October 1964 where he and other
members of the Congress on Racial Equality parked their cars in key intersec-
tions surrounding the company's St. Louis operation during shift change.
Green was arrested for this action. On July 2, 1965, as chairman of another civil
rights group, ACTION, Green approved of a "lock in" of company personnel in
one of McDonnell Douglas's administrative offices. An ACTION member
chained and padlocked the building."' On July 26, 1965, Green applied for an
electrical mechanic job with the company. He was undisputedly qualified for
the job, but McDonnell Douglas rejected him because of the "stall in" and the
"lock in."3 6 2
Judge Meredith analyzed Green's discrimination claim from the traditional
management prerogatives perspective.3 6 3 McDonnell Douglas had the right to
refuse Green's reemployment for any reason.' Title VII only impacted that
right if Green could prove McDonnell Douglas discriminated against him
because of his race or a practice declared unlawful by the title. 6 1 Judge Mere-
dith did not believe Green's rejection was racially motivated. Nor did he
believe that McDonnell Douglas had engaged in prohibited retaliation. There
was no evidence that McDonnell Douglas ever criticized Green for his civil
rights advocacy while he worked for the company between 1960 and 1964.366
He believed McDonnell Douglas's sole reason for Green's rejection were the
"stall in" and the "lock in." This kind of illegal self-help was not the kind of civil
rights advocacy Title VII protected from employer retaliation. Title VII's pur-
pose was "not to license [employees] to commit unlawful or tortious acts or to
protect them from the consequences of unlawful conduct against their
employers."3 6 7
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Judge Meredith that Title VII
did not protect Green's unlawful protests."' McDonnell Douglas's rejection
was not retaliatory. Consistent with its jurisprudence of doubt and its reconcep-
tualization of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit remanded Green's race dis-
crimination for the district court to determine whether McDonnell Douglas's
357. See id. The Eighth Circuit's description of the employment relationship between Green
and McDonnell Douglas added that Green "remained with the company continuously, except for
twenty-one months of honorable military service." McDonnel Douglas, 463 F.2d at 339.
358. See McDonnel Douglas, 318 F. Supp. at 848.
359. Id. at 848.
360. See id. at 848-49.
361. See id. at 849.
362. Id.
363. For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between Title VII and the at-will employment
doctrine see Chuck Henson, In Defense of McDonnell Douglas: The Domination of Tite VII by the AL-Will
Employment Doctine, 89 Sr. JOHN's L. REV. 551 (2015).
364. See McDonnel Douglas, 318 F. Supp. at 850.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 850-51.
367. Id. at 851.
368. See Green v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972).
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reasons for rejecting Green "were related to the requirements of the job." 3 6 9
From the Eighth Circuit's perspective, the fact that Title VII's anti-retaliation
provisions did not prohibit McDonnell Douglas's rejection of Green for Green's
unlawful conduct, did not mean that McDonnell Douglas was exonerated from
the claim of race discrimination. Race discrimination was a separate standard.
From the court's perspective, McDonnell Douglas's position was that it retained
the "right under Title VII to make subjective hiring judgments which do not
necessarily rest upon the ability of the applicant to perform the work
required."s"o Relying specifically on its jurisprudence of doubt and the Court's
Griggs opinion, the Eighth Circuit made any "subjective" job qualification the
proxy for race discrimination for two reasons. First, Griggs specifically com-
manded that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown [by the employer] to be related to job performance, the prac-
tice is prohibited."3 ' Second, subjective hiring criteria were a mask for the
continuation of historical discrimination. 3 Subjective hiring judgments are
entitled to "little weight" unless the employer demonstrates that they measure
an applicant's ability to do the job.' Given the undisputed fact that Green
had the ability to do the job, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case so that
McDonnell Douglas could offer proof that other employees or supervisors
would refuse to work with Green because of his unlawful protest activity.
37 4
Up to this time the Eighth Circuit's reconceptualization of discrimination
based in its jurisprudence of doubt had been unanimous. Its Green decision was
not. In dissent, Judge Johnsen bluntly criticized the remand as an exercise in
futility for McDonnell Douglas. 7  The majority's holding can "only mean that
McDonnell is being required to rehire Green. "37 Most significantly, Judge
Johnson focused his opinion on revealing a latent tension between the major-
ity's reconceptualization of discrimination and the equality principle.
According to Judge Johnsen, the majority was compelling McDonnell
Douglas to grant Green special treatment because he was Black. Under his
reading of Griggs, the purpose and scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covered
a lack of equal opportunity, thus discrimination, stemming from employer prac-
tices, process and test which, regardless of intention, kept "blacks from
[employment of advancement] the same as whites, where the things so utilized
are without any significant relationship to a performance of the work
involved."s77
I do not see in [Griggs] a warrant for a holding that refusal by an employer
to hire a person who has engaged in such illegal conduct against it, as is here
involved, is entitled to be deemed to operate as a lack of equal opportunity in
employment, if the one who has done the misdeeds is a Negro. Surely the
majority does not mean to say that a Negro will not have equal opportunity for
employment within the intent of Title VII unless unlawful acts committed by
him against a business or an employer are required to be condoned, although
American concepts have never required such a business condonation as to a
white.3
7 8
369. Id. at 342.
370. Id. at 343.
371. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
372. See id.
373. See id. at 343-44.
374. See id. at 344.
375. See id. at 350.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 350.
378. Id.
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In short, the majority's reconceptualization of discrimination conflicted
with the equality principle because Green did not have to bear the burden of
proving race discrimination by showing that a white person who engaged in the
"stall in" would have gotten the job McDonnell Douglas denied him.3' 9 The
majority was giving Green an opportunity of a "different and greater degree"
than a white person."so Judge Johnsen did not see room for application of thejurisprudence of doubt to question the "subjectivity" of the company's rejection
of Green. There could be no question of discrimination, including hidden dis-
crimination on such an obvious point of rejection.381
This was the argument that McDonnell Douglas used to support its appeal
to the Supreme Court.382 The Eighth Circuit's reconceptualization of discrimi-
nation, by requiring employers to prove that all their employment decisions
met the narrow business necessity definition of Griggs, violated the equality
principle Title VII was meant to establish." The Eighth Circuit's fully
expressed jurisprudence of doubt was so strong that it operated to exclude evi-
dence of an employer's "subjective" motivations which could not be supported
when a decision maker's state of mind was the central question.38 4 Moreover,
Griggs had a context: an employer with a history of overt pre-Title VII discrimi-
nation that established general employment criteria that held back a dispropor-
tionate number of faultless Blacks:" There was no evidence that McDonnell
Douglas met either criterion, or that Green was suffering "the regrettable result
of years of racial subjugation [or] publicly sanctioned deprivation of adequate
education or training."386
In Green, the Eighth Circuit's reconceptualization of discrimination
reached its apogee. Green established the "basic assumption" 1.0. If the pur-
pose of Title VII was the elimination of all built-in headwinds to Black employ-
ment access and advancement, those headwinds were not limited to
standardized tests that impacted groups of Black applicants more than they did
whites. Nor was Title VII's purpose limited in application to the notorious dis-
criminators. Discrimination had no geographic limitations and was a very long-
lived phenomenon in America. Every black worker or applicant was a victim of
historical discrimination and a potential victim of the same discrimination in
the present. The elimination of all employment discrimination necessarily
required the practiced discriminators to prove they had stopped.
379. See id. at 349.
380. Id. at 355.
381. See id. at 348-49 ("[E]ven on the 'stall in' situation alone, I should not suppose that a
Gallup poll would be needed to show that any employer with self respect and with concern for his
relations with his other employees hardly would hire a workman, whether black or white, who had
engaged in such an unlawful and indicative misdeed against him, against his employees, and against
his business being permitted to operate.").
382. See Brief for Petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (No. 72-
490).
383. See id. at 18 ("The majority opinion held that 'subjective' evidence offered by an employer
is essentially unworthy of belief . . . ."); id. at 22 ("It must be borne in mind that the aim of Title VII is
equality ofemployment opportunity, not a guarantee of employment ... Yet, in carving out special rules
for blacks, the Court of Appeals has in actuality required discrimination against whites and has criti-
cally impaired the right of employers to make valid nondiscriminatory employment decisions."(emphasis in original)).
384. See id. at 34-35.
385. See id. at 26.
386. Id. at 27.
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IV. THE "BASIC AssuMPTION" 2.0: McDONNELL DoucLAs CoRP. v. GREEN-
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1973
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's reconceptualization of
discrimination.-8 7 The Court also set up what scholars today recognize as the
"basic assumption" but what has not been recognized as a version 2.0 of the
"basic assumption" underlying all Title VII jurisprudence between Judge
Butzner's decision in Quarles and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Green. There
had not been a definitive segregation of legal theories limiting those that drove
the results in Quarles, Griggs, Sheet Metal Workers, Parham, Marquez, and Green
from applying to "a private non-class action challenging employment discrimi-
nation."38 8 Only with the Court's McDonnell Douglas decision did scholars and
practitioners come to understand that the concept of discrimination applicable
to cases like Griggs did not overlap with cases of individuals like Percy Green.
By establishing a "basic assumption" 2.0, the Court validated Judge Johnsen
and McDonnell Douglas's arguments that the "basic assumption" 1.0 articulated
by the Eighth Circuit was an impermissible infringement of the equality princi-
ple. The Court stated that Title VII was not a guarantee of employment regard-
less of qualification.3 8 9 Moreover, "the Act does not command that any person
be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he
is a member of a minority group."3
0 This conceptualization of discrimination
contained the specific rejection of the Eighth Circuit's jurisprudence of doubt.
Where the Eighth Circuit saw the fact of American racism as a continuing men-
ace that existed because Blacks were the "subject of discrimination" in the past
and employers were so unlikely to have stopped discriminating against Blacks in
the present, the Court reinstated the safe harbor defined by the prospective-
only view of Title VII which the 88th Congress established, arguably, to keep the
realistic doubt about the ability of Americans to stop discriminating from
undermining the equality principle.
The Court described the equality principle in this way:
There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of this equa-
tion. The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and con-
sumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of
such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no discrimination,
subtle or otherwise.m3
9
The Court's reference to the equality principle is somewhat opaque
because it supports a variety of mutually supporting arguments about Title VII's
purposes and McDonnell Douglas's role in limiting the Title's elasticity. For
example, I have argued elsewhere that the Court's reference to the equality
principle establishes the link between its Title VII jurisprudence and the tide's
legal context: the at-will employment doctrine.
3 9 2 I have also argued that the
same language linked the McDonnell Douglas decision to Tide VII's legislative
history regarding the 88th Congress's intent to outlaw only the worst forms of
387. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
388. Id. at 800.
389. See id. at 800.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 801.
392. See Henson, supra note 363, at 582-83; see also William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and
Throwing Out Proof Structures: 11 Is Not Time tojettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. Rrs. & EMIP. PoL'YJ.
361, 363 n.12 (1998) ("The Court offered a succinct and eloquent statement of the interests and
policies to be balanced when Title VII steps into the modern employment setting, dominated by the
common law principles of employment at will . . . .").
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discrimination.3 3 Nevertheless, the reference to the "broad overriding" inter-
ests of all Americans about the Civil Rights Act of 1964 most specifically points
to the equality goal of the Civil Rights Era which, by 1973, remained a social
and emotional landmark of immense proportions. It constitutes a restatement
of the equality principle which is limited in application to access to employment
opportunity. Title VII's intolerance of any discrimination is an intolerance of
special treatment for Blacks because that would discriminate against whites.
The "basic assumption" 2.0 imbedded in McDonnell Douglas affirms this
reading of the equality principle by limiting the jurisprudence of doubt to
doubt about outcomes only, rather than doubt about motivation and outcomes.
As the Court would later describe it, McDonnell Douglas's basic assumption
inferred discriminatory animus because of history, but an inference of
improper motivation is not proof of a discriminatory outcome."' The infer-
ence merely allowed an employer, without shouldering a burden of proof, to
dispel any doubt that the outcome was discriminatory by merely articulating
that it was not discriminatory. 9 5
The result of the Court's reconceptualization of discrimination was not
obvious immediately after McDonnell Douglas. As late as 1976, Griggs remained
the centerpiece of Title VII analysis. One scholar was still reeling from the
possibilities Griggs seemed to open for achieving first class economic citizenship
for Blacks because under Griggs "past discrimination by [an employer or union]
may not be required if there is present discrimination, including the present
effects of past discrimination."3 9 6 McDonnell Douglas was not seen as the start of a
distinctive line of what we now call disparate treatment jurisprudence. It was a
part of the Griggsjurisprudence. McDonnell Douglas's "greatest contribution was
to [allow the Court] to give [Giggs] more substantive content.""' That sub-
stantive content included a direction that Title VII was not limited to the south-
ern pattern of de jure segregation but included northern defacto discrimination,
that statistical evidence regarding testing, workforce composition were signifi-
cant indicia of discriminatory patterns and the burden on employers of estab-
lishing the job relatedness defense would be a heavy one.3 8 McDonnell Douglas
itself merely "cautioned against the overuse of Griggs.""' Griggs simply did not
cover "the normal sanctions associated with serious employee misconduct.""0 0
Similarly, Griggs so dominated Professor Derrick Bell's 1976 commentary
on equal employment law that McDonnell Douglas was literally a footnote in his
criticism of Title VII and its jurisprudence."o According to Bell, Griggs and
cases based in its jurisprudence are only significant for "very few workers"
because on close analysis they "reveal conditions and restrictions on relief that
limit the holding [s] to overt instances of discrimination seldom resorted to by
contemporary employers."40 2 Griggs' mandate that tests measure only the abil-
ity to do the job was declaring itself to be limited to blue collar positions partic-
ularly after Washington v. Davis." The "rightful place" remedy only applied
393. See Henson, supra note 363, at 583; Henson, supra note 33, at 99-105.
394. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993).
395. See Henson, supra note 363, at 580 n.137.
396. Jones, supra note 13, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
397. Id. at 6.
398. See id. at 7-8.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 9.
401. See Bell, supra note 11.
402. Id. at 682.
403. See id.; see alo Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in Upper Level Jobs 73 COLuM. L.
REv. 1614 (1973) (arguing that Griggs's application to discrimination in a variety management posi-
tions was possible but uncertain because of the smaller numbers of management jobs compared to
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when jobs were plentiful but not when the recession of the mid-70s caused mas-
sive layoffs of more recently hired Blacks and courts upheld the reverse senior-
ity layoff policies under Title VII.40 4 These legal events, among others, left Bell
to conclude that "the law, as presently interpreted, [left] minority workers with-
out protection against the adverse effects of past discrimination at just those
points in the economic cycle when they need it most."40 5 As a remedy, Bell
advocated self-help because there would not be meaningful gains without pro-
test.406 At the same time, citing McDonnell Douglas for support in a footnote,
Bell recognized that courts would not legitimize self-help.4 07
Over time, however, Griggs receded in importance. Its reconceptualization
of discrimination to exclude discriminatory intent in limited circumstances nar-
rowly avoided extirpation.4 0 8 McDonnell Douglas came into its own.
400 Its heavy
presence as the conceptualization of discrimination blossomed as the Court
took almost twenty years to fully explain what McDonnell Douglas was. During
that time, McDonnell Douglas became known as the fount of the "basic assump-
tion."410 The cases that explain the true nature of McDonnell Douglas, particu-
larly the final explanation in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, were criticized for
destroying the "basic assumption"4 11 and McDonnell Douglas itself lost its
luster.4 12 Although McDonnell Douglas has been regularly touted as a gift to
plaintiffs, 1 the main proponent of this view has been the Court.
4 14 And the
apparent result for Blacks has been dismal.
In the absence of the Eighth Circuit's jurisprudence of doubt of motive,
including the burden of proof on the alleged discriminator, the "basic assump-
tion" 2.0 of McDonnell Douglas allowed a disbelief in the existence of discrimina-
tion against Blacks to prosper. 15 Empirical research has shown that
lower level jobs and because of the difficulty of evaluating the validity of "subjective" qualities on which
much management level employment was based).
404. See Bell, supra note 11, at 683.
405. Id.
406. See id. at 685.
407. See id. at 685 n.17.
408. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-167, 101 Stat. 1101.
409. Corbett, supra note 392, at 363-64 ("Since 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has flour-
ished in the courts, becoming the predominant method for analyzing intentional employment dis-
crimination claims. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas has been so influential that it has spread beyond
employment discrimination cases to cases brought under other types of state and federal employment
laws and to discrimination cases in contexts other than employment law.").
410. Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Bric Assumption 26
CONN. L. Rev. 997 (1994).
411. See id. at 1008 ("The district court and the majority of the Supreme Court in Hicks reached
their result, not because it was required by any formal legal rules, but rather because they just plain do
not believe in [the] basic assumption."); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment
After Hicks, 93 Mia-. L. Rev. 2229, 2317-24 (1995). But see, Henson, supra note 363, at 587-96 (argu-
ing that because of the at-will employment doctrine and a congressional mandate of ending only the
worst forms of discrimination, the basic assumption was always weak, and Hicks only clarified and
exposed its latent weakness).
412. See Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without A Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not justified
by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REv. 743 (2006) (arguing that there is no statutory
basis for the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas interpretation of Title VII).
413. See William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1549,
1555 (2005); Corbett, supra note 392, at 377.
414. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor,J., concurring)
("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thur-
ston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are
designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evi-
dence.") (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).
415. See Michael Selmi, W4y Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv.
555, 562 (2001) ("Race discrimination claims are generally thought to be the most difficult employ-
ment claim to succeed on, and when it comes to race, the courts' bias tends toward our common
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"[c]ompared to whites and other people of color, African-American plaintiffs
are significantly more likely to have their cases dismissed or lose on all claims at
summary judgment and are less likely to receive any settlement and to prevail at
trial if the case goes that far."4"' Moreover, white plaintiffs claiming race dis-
crimination have "fared significantly better than nonwhite plaintiffs."4 17 A lead-
ing empiricist on disparate treatment, Professor Wendy Parker, has
demonstrated that Blacks are suspiciously subject to losing their disparate treat-
ment cases. 1"8 The likelihood of Blacks losing is so high in proportion to other
discrimination claims that Professor Parker questions whether, over time,judges have come to agree with employers that there is no racial discrimination
and only a legitimate reason to explain why a Black applicant was rejected, or
why a Black worker did not succeed."'
Today, discrimination against Blacks, as understood by the courts, is some-
thing like radiation. It has a half-life. The potency it built up in American
business, unions, and people over the 450 years before July 2, 1965, has been
steadily dissipating with an anticipated end point in 2028.420 Following that
reasoning, Title VII's accomplishments would include winning the cold war,
erecting an enduring symbol of equality and successfully ending the discrimina-
tion against Blacks that caused the 88th Congress to pass the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
definition of bias."); see also Calloway, supra note 410, at 998 (arguing that with the Hicks decision "the
Court both questioned the continued prevalence of discrimination and invited lower courtjudges andjuries to do the same").
416. Wendy Parker, juries, Race and Gender: A Story of Today's Inequality 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
209, 226 n.133 (2011) (quoting LAURA BETI NIELSEN ET AL., Am. BAR FOUND., CONTESTING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LrnGATION 1987-2003 (2008), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/
nielsen-abf edreport_08_final.pdf).
417. Id. at 231.
418. See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 889, 893; 893 n.15 (2006) (arguing that when it comes to race "the current perception ofjudges
as ignoring subtle discrimination and deferring to defendants is perhaps a little too optimistic. The
current status of race employment discrimination is actually worse than previously told. Courts are
doing more than deferring to defendants; they are actually agreeing with the defendants due to what I
term an "anti-race plaintiff ideology."). That ideology is not merely anti-plaintiff. "I am contending
that race plaintiffs are treated worse for reasons that are perhaps unknowable or indefinable, but for
reasons that don't appear to be race neutral." Id.
419. See id. at 893, 893 n.15; see also id. at 933 ("The courts today are not seeking to undermine
employment discrimination jurisprudence. Instead, the judiciary believes quite often that the particu-
lar situation before it demonstrates no discrimination-that the plaintiffs claims lack merit and the
defendants are right as a matter of law.")
420. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
Although Grutter discussed the sunset of a racially diverse law school student body as a compelling
governmental interest, the case stands for the larger proposition of when does the United States stop
any effort to remediate the continuing harms of past discrimination. As we approach 2028, the antici-
pated sunset of the lawful consideration of race in admission in higher education, the Court seems
impatient with the idea that this country's history of racism remains relevant. For example, in Ash v.
Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006),Justice Thomas writing for the Court declared that the use of the
word "boy" by a white supervisor to address a Black employee in rural Alabama might or might not be
evidence of racism, reversing the Eleventh Circuit decision declaring that it was not racist unless it wasjoined to race with a hyphen as in "black-boy." On remand, the Eleventh Circuit still found that "boy"
was not racist under the circumstances. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App'x 924, 926 (11th Cir.
2006). One can view the Court imposed sunsetting of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), as a similar statement that the country is on the verge of
transcending centuries of racial inequality.
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V. RE-RECONCEWIUALIZINc DISCRIMINATION?
Anyone living in or observing America since the election of Barack Hussein
Obama as the 44th President of the United States must acknowledge that dis-
crimination is alive and well. Its reality is unlike that of a radioactive element.
It has no half-life. According to Professor Bell, racism and the discrimination
that flows from it are likely "permanent component[s] of American life."
4 1
This story of the conceptualization and reconceptualization fits in the pattern
of long valleys and short-lived peaks Bell surveyed as evidence that "Black peo-
ple will never gain full equality in this country."
42 2 Supportive of that proposi-
tion is how, as predicted, discrimination has evolved a clandestine language in
the courts where "fit" and "appearance" mask obvious invidious choices based
on primary and secondary characteristics directly tied to race.' Is the solution
to discrimination as ultimately reconceptualized by McDonnell Douglas in the
"basic assumption" 2.0 a return to "basic assumption" 1.0 of the Eighth Circuit?
Title VII may continue to have a purpose beyond the symbolic if it can be
interpreted to recognize the indelibility and pervasiveness of discrimination. It
will never accomplish making Blacks first class economic citizens, but it might
create a hope that Black Americans do not have to tolerate invidious treatment
in their employment because ofTitle VII. A possible solution lies in combining a
modern scientific understanding of how bias exists and operates with an aban-
donment of McDonnell Douglas's burden shifting feature so that Black claimants
can have juries decide whether, in their experience, an employer engaged in
rightful or wrongful conduct. 4 24
The Court's conception of discrimination is based on a false and simplistic
view of how people make decisions about other people.
42 5 Although based in
lived experience and wise expectation rather than the science of implicit bias,
421. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACIsm 13 (1992).
422. Id. at 12.
423. See Renee E. Henson, Are My Cornrows Unprofessional?: Title VII's Narrow Application of Groom-
ing Policies, and its Effect on Black Women's Natural Hair in the Workplace, I Bus., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX
L. REv. 522 (2017).
424. Having practiced law as an employment defense litigator and trial lawyer for most of my
nearly thirty years since graduation, I do not share Professor Calloway's concerns about juries. See
Calloway, supra note 410, at 998 (describing a fear thatjuries sharejudges' unfounded and inaccurate
beliefs about the "continued prevalence of virulent discrimination our society"). Professor Parker's
work has shown that although Black disparate treatment plaintiffs almost never win their cases, when
they do it was at a jury trial. See Parker, supra note 418, at 894. On the other hand, she has also
demonstrated that Blacks and Latinos claiming race discrimination have the lowest win rates in jury
trials. See Parker, supra note 416, at 211. Professor Parker notes that the explanation may be juror
bias, but the evidence is inconclusive. See id. I believe that no matter their convictions, every member
of a venire has either worked a job and felt unfairly treated or known someone who has. Plaintiffs are
better off having their peers judge the facts of their cases. Society is better off too because the demo-
cratic evaluation of the law that happens as a function of deliberating and rendering a verdict will be a
more wholesome barometer of whether Americans believe in the validity of anti-discrimination law. If
juries render verdicts predominately against Black plaintiffs, the data is more important that any suspi-
cion or any mechanism, like McDonnell Douglas. In short, it would be better to know that, as a general
proposition, society believes that racial discrimination against Blacks has ceased to exist.
425. Take, for example, the Court's decision in Furaco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978). Furnco involved the company's hiring practices for bricklayers. A white superintendent of
bricklaying hired only from a list of all white bricklayers with whom he was familiar and denied
employment to qualified black bricklayers because they were not on his list. See Waters v. Furnco
Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1086 (7th Cir. 1977). Before the Seventh Circuit, Furnco argued that
white men not on the list would also not have been hired. The Seventh Circuit rejected that
argument:
The record does not show that white bricklayers did in fact seek work in the same manner as
plaintiffs. In any event, the seeming equality of treatment is deceptive. The historical ine-
quality of treatment of black workers seems to us to establish that it is prima facie racial
discrimination to refuse to consider the qualifications of a black job seeker before hiring
from an approved list containing only the names of white bricklayers. How else will qualified
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the Eighth Circuit's jurisprudence of doubt as to motivation was a correct
description of how deep the roots of discrimination against Blacks run in this
country. This is the concept undergirding the argument that every decision
and every system is tainted in the present with a history of discrimination.
Griggs was less explicit in acknowledging this argument but at its core, it made
intent a non-issue and recognized that historical discrimination can have pre-
sent remediable impacts. Griggs's core survived in the 1991 Civil Rights Act and
became a formal part of Title VII.4 16 If intent can be irrelevant for disparate
impact, the meaning of intent for disparate treatment could be mined for val-
ues beyond evil motive, to the knowing consequences of an action to ignoring
well known concepts about how all people make decisions. If, for example, an
employer knows that implicit bias exists (and how could they not) and that it
can be revealed for free by taking one or more online the Implicit Association
Tests, why should Title VII shield an employer from liability for discriminating
against a Black employee or applicant merely because an employer denied dis-
criminating? Arguably, the equality principle demands using the discovery of
information tending to show that a decision was not race neutral, like implicit
bias, to balance the scales.
Judges must stand aside at this point and allow juries to use their knowl-
edge of employment discrimination at trial. As Professor Parker, among others,
points out, judges seem to be part of the problem.' They have lost the ability
to identify discrimination against Blacks that Title VII could penalize.428 This
has happened, I assert, for at least two reasons. First, judges have been trained
not to see employment discrimination against Blacks. It is part of their training
in law school and part of the training that comes from being reversed by courts
black applicants be able to overcome the racial imbalance in a particular craft, itself the result
of past discrimination?
Id. at 1089. In order to deal with the problem of the Black bricklayer being foreclosed from employ-
ment because he was not on the superintendent's list, the Seventh Circuit proposed that Furnco adopt
a policy of taking written applications from Black bricklayers and the "applicant's claims could be
checked and evaluated, and compared with the qualifications and experience of those on the list[ ]"
instead of "relying on recollections of the brick superintendent and recommendations he accepted
from others, [which] was by its nature haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective." Id. at 1088-89. The
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit because the record contained no evidence that the Sev-
enth Circuit's hiring method would be any less haphazard and arbitrary than Furnco's and because
there was no finding of intentional discrimination tojustify the Seventh Circuit's decision. SeeFuraco,
438 U.S. at 578. In other words, in disparate treatment cases all business decisions are treated as
rational until a plaintiff proved intentional discrimination. This proposition assumes a conscious
awareness of all the influences on a given decision either by the employer or by the Court. In Hicks,
for example, the Court supported Judge Limbaugh's conclusion at the district court level that Hick's
proof of pretextual firing was only proof of a personality conflict between a black employee and a
white employer. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993). Judge Limbaugh, not
the employer, asserted the personality conflict as a legitimate ground for Hick's termination. See Hick
v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244,1251-52 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Modern science on how people
think and behave has found, to the contrary, that much decision-making occurs unconsciously includ-
ing biased decisions based on racial stereotyping against Blacks. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY
G. GREENWALo, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013).
426. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-167, 101 Stat. 1101.
427. Parker, supra note 418, at 939 ("Judges . . . seem to be opting out of race and national
origin disparate treatment cases-because employers are right . . . ."). On the apparent general anti-
plaintiff bias of the judiciary in employment discrimination cases see Kevin M. Clermont & StewartJ.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV.
103, 112 (2009) ("In this surprising plaintiff/defendant difference in the federal courts of appeals, we
have unearthed an anti-plaintiff effect that is troublesome." (emphasis in original)).
428. Parker, supra note 418, at 894; see also id. at 895 ("[J]udges are dismissing more race cases
on pretrial motions than they are gender discrimination cases."); Clermont & Schwab, snpra note 427,
at 131 ("In employment discrimination litigation ... it may be that trial judges are more demanding of
plaintiffs than juries are, or at least are exhibiting a well-founded fear of any judgments for plaintiffs
being more likely reversed.").
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of appeals.'" Second, judges are so far removed from the ordinary exper-
iences of people's ordinary lives that they cannot successfully fulfill the role of
peers finding facts and processing those facts through the lived experience of
people who can lose theirjobs."so This is not to say that judges as a class have
never experienced discrimination. For example, all Black judges have exper-
ienced discrimination in this country. Social scientists tell us that they also
experience discrimination as judges because their white peers are statistically
more likely to question their judgments."3 ' On the other hand, a federal dis-
trict court judgeship is a lifetime sinecure regardless of every classification pro-
tected under Title VII. I submit that having a job of that stature from which
one cannot be fired diminishes rather than increases a sensitivity to the reality
of the modern workplace."3 2
McDonnell Douglas as a scheme for parsing evidence had its day."' It was
adopted for use by judges in bench trials when Title VII claimants could not
have ajury trial. Even then, it was harmfully simplistic in its fixation on a single
motivation. It was never intended, by its own language, as an exclusive method
of understanding whether discrimination occurred. Wise judges should reject
it as an unhelpful, unnecessary anachronism. The equality principle will bejust
as virulent in preventing "special treatment" for Blacks without it.
CONCLUSION
Title VII has served at least two related purposes; both entirely symbolic.
For foreign audiences, it gave the United States a valid basis for asserting that
America was the model for equality in a democratic society in the Cold War.
Domestically, it created a similar symbol. Problematically, the equality princi-
ple, which sat at the center of the symbol, prohibited Title VII from having any
greater purpose, such as a compensatory remedy that would deal with specifi-
cally training Blacks for jobs and giving Blacks jobs on a preferential basis as
compensation for hundreds of years of inequality specific to the Black experi-
ence in this country. I hope that I have shown how, in the period of time
before the Court drew a line between disparate impact and disparate treatment
in McDonnell Douglas, it was possible to reconceptualize discrimination to briefly
remedy the present impact of historical discrimination driven in large part by
429. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 427, at 131.
430. Id. at 113 (discussing reasons for anti-plaintiff bias at appellate court level, suggesting that
"unconscious biases may be at work at the appellate level. Perhaps appellate judges' distance from the
trial process creates an environment in which it is easy to discount harms to the plaintiff.").
431. Cf Hidden Brain: A Conversation About Lifes Unseen Patterns, Mind of the Village, NPR (Mar. 9,
2018), https://www.npr.org/201 8 /0 3 /09/591895426/the-mind-of-the-village-understanding-our-
implicit-biases. In this episode, Dr. Maya Sen, Associate Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School,
describes research in the field of implicit bias on whether and why Black judges get reversed more
often than their white peers. Such implicit bias exists. According to Dr. Sen:
So essentially what we find-what I find-and this is very consistent across different kinds of
ways of slicing and dicing the data, which is that black judges have a very, very consistently-
have a consistently higher reversal rate. They are much more likely to be reversed once a
case that they've written has been appealed to a higher court. And that's the case regardless
of whether we control for or take into account differences in the court in which they sit, the
kinds of cases that they hear, their age, their gender, their professional experience, their
qualifications ratings from the American Bar Association. It's actually a very, very sticky find-
ing. So essentially, black judges are more likely to be reversed by higher courts.
Id.
432. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 427, at 131.
433. Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERsFI.EvJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 257 (2013)
(asserting that over the last twenty years courts have been in the process of "eroding the McDonnell
Douglas test's power through both procedural and substantive means"). Moreover, the continued over-
statement of McDonnell Douglas's vitality by scholars and courts is holding back a speedier erosion. See
id. at 271.
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the Eighth Circuit's jurisprudence of doubt which led to Griggs and then moved
beyond a small set of incumbent Black employees in racially stratified employ-
ment in southern businesses to all employment decisions impacting Blacks
whether applicants or veteran employees. Although I am not sanguine about
any positive developments in Title VII's purpose today, I hope the ideas I pro-
posed may be useful in some subsequent reconceptualization of discrimination.
As it stands, however, Title VII has failed to move beyond the symbolic and
seems to be, ironically, the reason why Blacks continue to suffer from employ-
ment discrimination.

